The Psychosocial Reality of Digital Travel by Tjostheim, Ingvar & Waterworth, John A.
The Psychosocial Reality 
of Digital Travel 
Being in Virtual Places
Ingvar Tjostheim
John A. Waterworth
The Psychosocial Reality of Digital Travel
“A common approach today in book-length human-oriented treatments of new
digital technologies is to jump right in and start discussing issues as if there were
no previous theoretical works worthy of systematic consideration. Tjostheim and
Waterworth try another tack in The Psychosocial Reality of Digital Travel. Their
text contains a careful selection of theoretical perspectives for the key issues they
discuss. What a difference that makes! Their combination of theoretical insights
with user studies and critical analysis makes for an excellent read. Reading this
book can help further one’s own thinking with regards to the emerging new area
of digital travel, as well as to virtual reality and presence research, place theory,
the philosophy of perception and a host of other related topics, in a way that
can only happen when elements of theory, empirical work, and analysis support
each other meaningfully.”
—Anders Hedman, Associate Professor, KTH Royal Institute of Technology,
Sweden
“Can virtual travels become as attractive as real ones? In this insightful book,
Tjostheim and Waterworth suggest that although a digital journey differs from
a ‘physical’ one in many respects, it can be a rich and satisfying experience,
provided that it enables the traveller to achieve a high sense of ‘presence’ – the
feeling of ‘being there.’ However, as the authors convincingly show, creating
presence is not just a technological challenge: imagination, expectations, and the
story or narrative through which the traveller makes sense of the journey also
play a key role.”
—Andrea Gaggioli, Professor, Director of the ExperienceLab, Università Cattolica
del Sacro Cuore, Italy
“This book offers an original and informative interpretation of travel in the
electronically permeated world in which we now live. I was particularly intrigued
by the authors’ development of the idea of behavioural outsideness as an aspect
of digital experiences of place. Virtual travel may not be a substitute for visiting
somewhere, but this book shows that the increasingly realistic 3D rendering
of places in digital games and other tele-technologies does provide a powerful
affirmation of actual travel experiences.”
—Edward Relph, Emeritus Professor, Department of Geography and Planning,
University of Toronto, Canada
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Abstract When physical travel to a specific place is prohibited or other-
wise difficult or impossible, digital travel provides a promising alternative.
The technology to do this is now widely available and many people have
the possibility to meet with others digitally, and thus alleviate the social
effects of physical isolation. Digital travel can also be source of pleasure
and entertainment, and many people spend time exploring and inter-
acting in digital places, realistically rendering in 3D games. But despite
the recent upsurge in virtual social interaction, it does not meet many of
the psychosocial aspects of the travel experience. In this book, we take a
fresh look at the nature of the telepresence experience in digital environ-
ments. We also address a number of relevant questions, such as whether
these experiences can seem real to the digital traveller and, if so, under
what conditions and on what grounds.
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2 I. TJOSTHEIM AND J. A. WATERWORTH
Why Digital Travel?
The history of travel goes hand in hand with the history of humanity.
Travel and tourism are many-faceted, and can be studied using methods
from many research traditions. Very few researchers, or people in general,
use the terms digital travel or virtual travel, even though conditions in
our societies differ significantly from the recent past. Understanding what
these terms mean needs to draw on a range of contexts and research tradi-
tions, which is what we have attempted to do in this book. In tourism
research, for example, the focus is often on the experience, what travellers
do and where they go (the destinations of travel). Telepresence research,
a relatively new research area, often concerns how to understand why we
have a feeling of being there, in a virtual place, and how to measure this
experience, but this has not often been framed as digital travel.
People increasingly travel, visit and meet other people digitally in
computer-mediated environments. The covid-19 pandemic, and the
restrictions on physical meetings and travel that have come with it, has
resulted in an enormous change in behaviour and attitudes towards the
practicality and acceptability of replacing physical encounters with virtual
ones. Prior to this, videoconferencing and other technologies were already
used in business and as a way for families and friends to keep in touch over
distances. Recent developments have led to many other kinds of meetings
and events taking place without physical travel; for example, concerts,
school and college classes, sports events, academic and other conferences,
training and personal development courses and medical consultations.
Many computer games use realistically presented (distant) places as the
venue for action. These may be fictional, but are often digital versions of
actual physical places, such as museums, famous localities, sports stadiums,
motor racetracks, cities and so on. In these and other virtual environ-
ments, the visitor may explore and sightsee in ways that are somewhat
analogous to being a tourist in a physical location. But there are signif-
icant differences between being a virtual tourist and physically travelling
for pleasure to places people live and work, as a tourist traditionally does.
To travel to a particular place at a particular time has always been
important for people. When physical travel to a specific place is prohibited
or otherwise difficult or impossible, virtual travel provides a promising
alternative. If we cannot go to an event and meet our friends, colleagues
or new acquaintances there, we can still meet via a teleconference system,
in a virtual room. The technology to do this is now widely available and
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many people have the possibility to meet with others in virtuality, and
so overcome—or at least alleviate—the social effects of physical isolation,
which is known to be detrimental to both physical and mental wellbeing.
But despite the recent upsurge in virtual social interaction, many people
feel that they are missing something important—the travel experience,
visiting places and meeting people face to face. And there is evidence
that such virtual interactions can be stressful and more tiring than their
physical counterparts.
The experience of physical place is also undergoing profound changes,
through the widespread adoption of mobile technology and, in particular,
the almost universal use of mobile phones. The way mobile phones are
used has been compared to a snail carrying its home on its back. Being
able to attend to the phone, and via the phone to distant people and
places, can provide a “home” into which we can retreat or return. Wher-
ever we are, however socially dull or difficult that place may be, we can
always take out our phone and “escape”. A recent study (Miller et al.,
2021) found that users across many age groups feel about their phones
in analogous ways to how they about their homes. In an interview with
the Guardian newspaper (Guardian, May 13, 2021) one of the authors,
Daniel Miller commented that “The smartphone is no longer just a device
that we use, it’s become the place where we live. The flip side of that for
human relationships is that at any point, whether over a meal, a meeting or
other shared activity, a person we’re with can just disappear, having ‘gone
home’ to their smartphone”. The possibility to mentally leave one’s current
social situation is referred to in the study as the “death of proximity” in
face-to-face interactions. These developments can be seen as making the
difference between physical and digital travel less striking.
Meetings between people increasingly take place in virtual spaces, via
teleconferencing systems such as Zoom, Teams and Skype. But these
meetings do not always satisfy the needs of the attendees, and may lead to
fatigue, to some extent by violating social interaction norms. For example,
in a typical working configuration at home, with a personal computer with
embedded camera, the people with which we meet may appear too close
for comfort, and we are also not used to seeing ourselves during meetings
in a way that may make us overly self-conscious (Bailenson, 2021).
Meyrowitz (1986) made the case that modern communication media
lack the sense of place that frames the social behaviours of the people
interacting within and through them. In these environments, people have
what seem to be face-to-face encounters, and yet they are not, since the
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participants are in different physical places and do not share the real expe-
rience of being in the same place. Meyrowitz’ vision was prescient, and
speaks directly to our intensely and increasingly media-networked rela-
tionships. We have “friends” on Facebook, for example, with people we
have never physically met, never shared the experience of an actual place
with. We meet them, but our meetings lack something vital to human
encounters—a real sense of travel to actual places. Relph (2021) talks
about widespread “digital disorientation” produced by the characteris-
tics of participatory and globally networked communication media. As he
comments: “The arduous and abrasive situations, discordance, speeding
up, and phantasmagoric mixing of cultural memories that are symptoms
of digital disorientation flourish in this quintessentially placeless environ-
ment”. (Relph, 2021, p. 574). And this disorientation is not limited
to digital interactions. Relph (2021) goes on to suggest that “because
participants in the web are also inhabitants of the material world, these
disruptions can come back to invade experiences of actual places”. Phys-
ical places are altered by digital encounters in cyberspace, a point to which
we return in later chapters.
The Mind of the Digital Traveller
In his book on travel, The Mind of the Traveler (Leed, 1991) Eric Leed
identifies and provides historical, sociological and psychological insights
about the different elements that together combine to form a journey,
carried out by a traveller. A journey consists of departure, passage and
arrival; each has its own characteristics and significance. Departure is not
only about leaving a place, no longer being there, but also involves a
change in the psyche, in the self. The traveller not only leaves a place, he
leaves a part of his identity by adopting another. For a few, the passage
from one place to another is an end in itself—the reason for travelling is
not to arrive somewhere, but to be in transit. But for most travellers, the
passage marks a process of transition, personal as well as physical, from
one place to another. It may be slow or fast, comfortable or arduous,
safe or hazardous, but it is always a process, a change marked by its own
character and imprinted on the traveller. In an arrival, the traveller is
either a stranger, or is coming home from a strange, a different, place.
Arriving is often risky: how does this place work? Will I be accepted?
Have things changed since last I was here? How should I behave?
Tourism scholars have extensively discussed the question of why
people travel and the tourist experience. Many scholars and authors have
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contributed to our understanding of travel, holidays and leisure activi-
ties and to see tourism as “a temporary reversal of everyday activities”,
as expressed by Cohen (1979), who identified several different modes
of tourism experience (to which we return later in Chapter 4). Tourism
can be characterised as a “home-away-back-home’’ journey. The nature of
tourism is that it involves both a going out, from home, and a return to
home. Nowadays, tourism is a huge industry, with broad economic impact
on countries around the world. But, more importantly, it has become a
part of the personal life of most people. A tourist has a desire to visit places
and to visually appreciate sights. The essence of tourism is visual consump-
tion, “the tourist gaze” (Urry, 1990, 1992a, 1992b). It is often mediated
through a camera; still photographic images or videos. The tourist then
views the world at a distance and, at its extreme, travel is a strategy for the
accumulation of photographs (Urry, 1990: 139) to be viewed and shared,
or just filed away. The notion of the tourist gaze emphasises a person’s
mental distance from a remote place. “The post-tourist knows that they are
a tourist and that tourism is a game, or rather a whole series of games with
multiple texts and no single, authentic tourist experience” (Urry, 1990:
100; cf. Turner et al., 2005). Urry emphasises the visual; tourists visit
“sights” and enjoy seeing places.
Virtual tourism and VR for tourism can be traced back to the early
1990s (Bauer and Jacobsen, 1995; Benjamin & Cooper, 1995; Cheong,
1995; Dewailly, 1999; Williams & Hobson, 1995). In the 1990s, research
on virtual tourism was primarily conducted by IT-researchers and it was
anticipated that virtual tourism would become a mainstream knowledge
domain for adoption by the tourism industry. We are not there yet.
Some also investigated the relationship between virtual tourism and actual
travelling, seeing the former as a potential marketing tool.
Fencott (1999) and Fencott et al. (2003) argued that the longer visi-
tors linger overall in a virtual tourism environment, the more likely they
are to find the virtual experience memorable and perhaps retain the desire
to actually visit the place the VE is modelling. Williams (2006) discusses
how technology can produce virtual visits, and some implications for
tourism of a virtual visit. Losh (2006) describes how the serious game
Virtual Iraq can be used to trigger memories and stimulate coping mech-
anisms in combat veterans suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,
an example of a wide range of similar work capitalising on the psychother-
apeutic potential of VR. This potential is presumably based on similarities
between experiencing the VR and experiencing the actual situation in
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physical reality. Widyarto and Latiff (2007) emphasise that a virtual appli-
cation works well in a travel context as a tool for getting to know the
place and navigation purposes, but they also argued that it cannot replace
the real-world experience.
It might be that a tourist does not accept a virtual substitute, but expo-
sure to the virtual place may nevertheless increase their desire to visit the
actual place (Dewailly, 1999). According to Beck et al. (2019) there are
studies that suggest that VR, regardless of whether it is non-, semi- or
fully immersive, is capable of positively influencing an individual’s moti-
vation to actually visit a place. According to Plunkett (2011) a virtual
experience can create an attachment to a place, and this may not be to
the place as displayed on the screen, but to the physical place it represents.
Tourism is, for good reasons, of interest to telepresence research because
the tourist experience is a multisensory experience (Rickly-Boyd, 2009)
and because the “there” in being there (a characterisation of telepresence)
can be a tourist destination.
The “there” in the being there of telepresence and the “there” of actu-
ally visiting and experiencing a place in travel and tourism is a red thread
running through the structure of this book. Each chapter addresses both
perspectives; physical being and virtual being. In telepresence the “being
there” is in most cases relatively short or “in the moment”, while physical
travel and tourist experiences are longer and do not evaporate when we
have breaks in presence—a sudden glitch, power outage or simply turning
off the device we are using.
In situ, for instance, as a tourist at holiday destination, we do not think
about whether where we are is real or not. But when we play a digital
game, this factor has an effect. Schwartz (2006) argues that realism and
attention to detail allow gamers to experience game spaces as real. As an
example, he quotes a player of the video game Grand Theft Auto: “You
feel as if you’re in a real town/city with other people” (p. 315). From obser-
vations such as this, it can be inferred that some gamers visit and explore
a game space in a manner similar to tourists exploring a physical space.
Schwartz concludes that video game environments afford the blending of
fantasy and realistic aspects into a believable, attractive place for players
to visit.
In his review article on virtual tourism, Guttentag (2010) discusses
many aspects of relevance for the tourism industry. He observes that
virtual tours are often panoramic photographs that do not permit any
free navigation, meaning that they are not what he describes as genuine
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VR—explorable 3D spaces (Guttentag, 2010). Surprisingly, there seems
to be very little overlap between the telepresence literature and the virtual
tourism literature (Yung & Khoo-Lattimore, 2019). Guttentag (2010)
cites only three papers from the two leading journals on telepresence; two
papers from Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments and one
paper from Cyberpsychology, Behaviour and Social Networking. This indi-
cates that very few tourism researchers have built on telepresence research.
There is one noticeable exception; the authors of the publications from
the Benogo project explicitly link tourism and telepresence (Turner et al.,
2013), and human geography to experiences in VEs (O’Neill, 2005;
Benyon et al., 2006; Turner & Turner, 2006; Turner et al., 2005). This
is in line with the mission of the project; Benogo stands for “Be there
without going there”. Clearly, virtual tourism is related to telepresence
since both concern the feeling of being there.
The telepresence researcher Mel Slater does not discuss tourism per
se, but emphasises the idea of place in being there. He writes: “this
‘experiencing-as-a-place’ is very much what I have tried to convey as a
meaning of presence in VEs: people are ‘there’, they respond to what is ‘there’,
and they remember it as a ‘place’” (Slater, 1999: 562). In a more recent
paper, Slater and Sanchez-Vives (2016) discuss virtual travel with refer-
ence to Cheong’s (1995) visions for virtual tourism in the mid-1990s.
They conclude the section by writing (p. 27); “Perhaps, VR is not meant
to be a substitute for real travel but just another form of travel, no less
valid in its own terms than all that physically boarding the real aeroplane
entails”.
A study by Lombard and Weinstein (2012) has a quote from a person
who filled in the Telepresence Experience Survey , a survey instrument
designed to let the participants use their own words to describe different
types of (tele)presence experience. One of the participants wrote “I
completely felt that I was a part of the world and the characters and settings
were all real and places I have been”, (p. 6). The quote indicates that the
person had a strong virtual tourism experience.
In tourism research some refer to the telepresence concept, but there
remains a dearth of empirical work, including using ways of measuring
telepresence. Gretzel (2011: 758) observes that while science and tech-
nology studies have permeated other fields, it is absent from mainstream
tourism literature. One of the aims in the book is to correct this lack in
the literature.
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In what follows, we take a fresh look at the nature of the telepresence
experience in digital environments, at a time when more and more people
are engaged in meetings and other interactive experiences within virtual
environments (VEs) of one kind or another. We also address a number of
relevant questions, such as whether these experiences can seem real to the
virtual traveller and, if so, under what conditions and on what grounds?
And more generally to what extent can technology be designed to make
up for the needs that physical travel fills, in light of findings on physical
and social presence in virtual environments?
Can a “home-away-back-home” metaphor derived from tourism be
usefully applied to virtual travel, for example? Can virtual spaces become
true social places that satisfy the requirements for host–guest interactions,
and become fulfilling destinations for travel? We know that interactive
technology can be used to create a convincing fantasy world, and also
to replicate a place that actually exists. If a VR environment replicates a
place that a person can visit, what experience is created and how can we
understand it? This is an underlying theme in the book and is directly
related to our choice for discussion of theories and findings from a range
of fields, including philosophy, psychology and social science, telepresence
research, human geography and tourism studies.
A Roadmap for the Book
Having outlined and briefly discussed relevant concepts related to virtual
spaces and digital travel in this chapter, we move on to consider in more
detail the feeling of “being there” for the quality and success of virtual
social interactions and travels to distant (or fictional) places. We start
in Chapter 2 by examining what is known about the sense of being
somewhere, using arguments based on relevant theories of embodiment,
perception, action and social behaviour. We think this largely philosoph-
ical overview is helpful in understanding the material to be covered later,
especially with regard to presence, perceptual illusions and being in places.
Readers not wishing to go so deeply into these aspects may prefer to take
a shortcut to Chapter 3 and beyond.
In Chapter 3, we compare and contrast different current theoretical
accounts of telepresence, in the light of their plausibility and implications
for understanding in what ways people can experience a sense of being in
other places, with other people, using digital technology; how, through
digital technology, we can have a sense of being somewhere else.
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Next, in Chapter 4, we examine different notions of place, as outlined
in work in tourism studies and other applied social fields; how and when
different experiences of place arise for the traveller, and the distinction
between spaces and places and their respective characteristics and roles
in social interactions. We also look closely at a neglected topic in the
literature: How do telepresence and the sense of place relate to each
other?
Chapter 5 summarises and interprets findings from two sets of recent
empirical studies of the authors on digital travel. The first was on factors
affecting the sense of place experience, and telepresence, using video
games to create a sightseeing environment for participants. The second
was a survey of a broad sample of citizens on their attitudes to vaca-
tion planning and digital travel applications used before, during and after
visiting a tourist destination. We found that some respondents expect
to have digital travel experiences in the future, experiences that we can
describe as digital visits to a place without travelling physically.
Chapter 6 addresses the question of how we can design for virtual
travel and meetings, so that the experience is more satisfying, and real,
for participants. We selectively present current interactive design trends
and possibilities for a future in which more and more travel is virtual
rather than physical, in the light of the arguments and findings presented
earlier in the book. For example: Is it possible to maintain key role-
related aspects of behaviour in appropriately designed virtual, or mixed
reality spaces? What would this entail? Can the physical and the virtual be
blended to support embodied interaction in integrated places that span
distant boundaries? If such places can become real for the participants,
not only in the moment, but as lasting, memorable experiences of being
there, real virtual travel could then replace the currently disjointed social
interactions through the Internet that have become so familiar.
We complete our journey through this book by concluding our argu-
ment that the feeling one is actually in a place—the feeling of “being
there”—is vital to the quality and success of virtual social interactions
and travels to distant (or fictional) places. This is especially relevant at
times when travel is restricted or prohibited, since a lack of travel can
mean few social opportunities, leading to a sense of isolation and some-
times depression. Currently, however, virtual travel is unlike physical travel
in many significant respects, and does not adequately satisfy the socio-
psychological needs of people meeting, of tourists and their hosts, or of
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other kinds of travellers. We draw together our conclusions and present
speculations about the not-too-distant future, when digital travel may
become truly real.
References
Bailenson, J. N. (2021). Nonverbal overload: A theoretical argument for the
causes of Zoom fatigue. Technology, Mind, and Behavior, 2(1). https://doi.
org/10.1037/tmb0000030
Bauer, C., & Jacobson, R. (1995). Virtual travel: Promoting tourism to unfa-
miliar sites through pre-trip experience. In Information and communication
technologies in tourism (ENTER ’95) (pp. 17–21). Springer-Verlag.
Beck, J., Rainoldi, M., & Egger, R. (2019). Virtual reality in tourism: A state-of-
the-art review. Tourism Review, 74(3), 586–612. https://doi.org/10.1108/
TR-03-2017-0049
Benjamin, I., & Cooper, M. (1995). Virtual tourism—A realistic assessment of
virtual reality for the tourist industry. In Information and communication
technologies in tourism (ENTER’ 95) (pp. 135–143). Springer-Verlag.
Benyon, D., Smyth, M., O’Neill, S., McCall, R., & Carroll, F. (2006). The place
probe: Exploring a sense of place in real and virtual environments. Presence:
Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 15(6), 668–687. https://doi.org/
10.1162/pres.15.6.668
Cheong, R. (1995). The virtual threat to travel and tourism. Tourism Manage-
ment, 16(6), 417–422. https://doi.org/10.1016/0261-5177(95)00049-T
Cohen, E. (1979). Rethinking the sociology of tourism. Annals of Tourism
Research, 6(1), 18–35. https://doi.org/10.1016/0160-7383(79)90092-6
Dewailly, J. (1999). Sustainable tourist space: From reality to virtual reality?
Tourism Geographies, 1(1), 41–55. https://doi.org/10.1080/146166899087
21293
Fencott, C., van Schaik, P., Ling, J., & Shafiullah, M. (2003). The effects of
movement of attractors and pictorial content of rewards on users’ behaviour
in virtual environments: An empirical study in the framework of perceptual
opportunities. Interacting with Computers, 15(1), 121–140. https://doi.org/
10.1016/S0953-5438(02)00030-9
Fencott, C. (1999). Content and creativity in virtual environments design. In
Proceedings, proceedings of virtual systems and multimedia (pp. 308–317).
University of Abertay Dundee.
Gretzel, U. (2011). Intelligent systems in tourism. Annals of Tourism Research,
38(3), 757–779. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.annals.2011.04.014
Guttentag, D. A. (2010). Virtual reality: Applications and implications for
tourism. Tourism Management, 31(5), 637–651. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
tourman.2009.07.003
1 INTRODUCTION 11
Leed, E. J. (1991). The mind of the traveler: From Gilgamesh to global tourism.
Basic books.
Lombard, M., & Weinstein, L. (2012). What are telepresence experiences like
in the real world? A qualitative survey. In Proceedings, the 14th International
Society for Presence Research (ISPR).
Losh, E. (2006). The palace of memory: Virtual tourism and tours of duty in
tactical Iraqi and virtual Iraq. In Proceedings of the 2006 international confer-
ence on game research and development (pp. 77–86). Murdoch University.
Meyrowitz, J. (1986). No sense of place: The impact of electronic media on
social behavior (1. issued as an Oxford University Press paperback). Oxford
University Press.
Miller, D. (2021). The global smartphone: Beyond a youth technology. UCL Press.
https://doi.org/10.14324/111.9781787359611
O’Neill, S. (2005). Presence. Place and the Virtual Spectacle. Psychnology, 3(2),
149–161.
Plunkett, D. (2011). On place attachments in virtual worlds. World
Leisure Journal, 53(3), 168–178. https://doi.org/10.1080/04419057.2011.
606825
Relph, E. (2021). Digital disorientation and place. Memory Studies, 14(3), 572–
577. https://doi.org/10.1177/17506980211010694
Rickly-Boyd, J. M. (2009). The tourist narrative. Tourist Studies, 9(3), 259–280.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1468797610382701
Schwartz, L. (2006). Fantasy, realism, and the other in recent video games. Space
and Culture, 9(3), 313–325. https://doi.org/10.1177/1206331206289019
Slater, M. (1999). Measuring presence: A response to the Witmer and Singer
presence questionnaire. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments,
8(5), 560–565. https://doi.org/10.1162/105474699566477
Slater, M., & Sanchez-Vives, M. V. (2016). Enhancing our lives with immersive
virtual reality. Frontiers in Robotics and A, I , 3. https://doi.org/10.3389/
frobt.2016.00074
Smartphone is now ‘the place where we live’. (2021, May 10). https://www.
theguardian.com/technology/2021/may/10/smartphone-is-now-the-place-
where-we-live-anthropologists-say
Turner, P., & Turner, S. (2006). Place, sense of place, and presence. Presence:
Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 15(2), 204–217. https://doi.org/
10.1162/pres.2006.15.2.204
Turner, P., Turner, S., & Burrows, L. (2013). Creating a sense of place with a
deliberately constrained virtual environment. International Journal of Cogni-
tive Performance Support, 1(1), 54. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJCPS.2013.
053554
Turner, P., Turner, S., & Carroll, F. (2005). The tourist gaze: Towards contex-
tualised virtual environments. In P. Turner & E. Davenport (Eds.), Spaces,
12 I. TJOSTHEIM AND J. A. WATERWORTH
spatiality and technology (Vol. 5, pp. 281–297). Springer-Verlag. https://doi.
org/10.1007/1-4020-3273-0_19
Urry, J. (1990). The ‘consumption’ of tourism. Sociology, 24(1), 23–35. https://
doi.org/10.1177/0038038590024001004
Urry, J. (1992). The tourist gaze and the ‘environment’. Theory, Culture &
Society, 9(3), 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1177/026327692009003001
Urry, J. (1992). The tourist gaze “revisited.” American Behavioral Scientist,
36(2), 172–186. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764292036002005
Widyarto, S., Abd, S., & Latiff, M. (2007). The use of virtual tours for cognitive
preparation of visitors: A case study for VHE. Facilities, 25(7/8), 271–285.
https://doi.org/10.1108/02632770710753316
Williams, A. (2006). Tourism and hospitality marketing: Fantasy, feeling and fun.
International Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management, 18(6), 482–
495. https://doi.org/10.1108/09596110610681520
Williams, P., & Hobson, J. P. (1995). Virtual reality and tourism: Fact or fantasy?
Tourism Management, 16(6), 423–427. https://doi.org/10.1016/0261-517
7(95)00050-X
Yung, R., & Khoo-Lattimore, C. (2019). New realities: A systematic literature
review on virtual reality and augmented reality in tourism research. Current
Issues in Tourism, 22(17), 2056–2081. https://doi.org/10.1080/13683500.
2017.1417359
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the
chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line
to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons
license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds




Abstract To understand the experience of being present somewhere else,
via a digital environment, we start by considering how we can experience
being anywhere. We present several different philosophical and psycho-
logical perspectives on this, stressing the importance of perception. Each
has something to offer and add to our understanding of digital travel. We
compare four philosophical views: representationalism, relationism, enac-
tivism and the sense-data view. Each has its strengths and weaknesses, but
relationism is best placed to accommodate perceptual illusions, which is a
prevalent view of the psychological nature of telepresence experiences. As
suggested by enactivism and the direct perception approach, the possibil-
ities for action in the world are important to the nature of our experience
of places. This, in turn, is influenced by the characteristics of the world in
which we act, through affordances.
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Introduction
“I am conscious of the world through the medium of my body” (1962:
94–95). It is from the body that I perceive the world. Without a body, I
have no place from which to perceive the world. “Where is begins with
the location of the body. It locates me in a place.” [….] “my existence
as subjectivity is merely one with my existence as a body and with the
existence of the world, and because the subject that I am, when taken
concretely, is inseparable from this body and this world”. Merleau-Ponty
(1962: 408)
In Chapter 1 we outlined the background to the book, and the overall
scope of topics to be covered. We address our theme—what is the
psychosocial reality of virtual travel?—in stages, waypoints on our journey
through the book. To experience any travel phenomena, a person needs
to be able to feel they are present in a place. To qualify as travel implies
that this place is somewhere other than the person’s usual environment.
To have the capacity to feel present in this other place, the person must
have the prerequisites of feeling they are present somewhere satisfied.
In this chapter we examine what is known about this sense of being
somewhere—the experience of presence in the world. Arguments are devel-
oped from relevant background theories of embodiment, perception,
psychology and philosophy. Some of the contemporary philosophical
background might be new terrain for the reader, but we feel that it
is useful as a grounding to understand our overall argument about the
impact of new technologies on the psychosocial realities of experience.
We start by examining philosophical and psychological aspects of
perceiving a world from a first-person perspective. Normally, people
assume that they perceive the world as it is. This is the layman’s perspec-
tive on the world. There are exceptions, but in everyday life we normally
do not question it—our ordinary conception of perception is of what
we experience with our senses. What if the experience is mediated by
technology? Can we then still use this common-sense view of perception?
Perceptual experience of the environment is complicated, particularly if
this involves continuous attention to and active engagement with one’s
surroundings, and where one’s own activities, both physical and atten-
tional, constitute key parts of the experience. One of the motivations for
this chapter is to explore the theoretical background for understanding an
experience in a virtual environment as an embodied perceptual experience.
Guided by our focus on telepresence, we review relevant theories
from contemporary philosophy on the nature of perception, as well
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as discussing dual process theory. Stanovich and West (2000) labelled
the two types of cognitive processes System 1 and System 2. Daniel
Kahneman made the theory known to a wider audience in his book
“Thinking, fast and slow” (2011). He states in his Nobel prize lecture
(2002) “judgments and preferences are called ‘intuitive’ in everyday
language if they come to mind quickly and effortlessly, like percepts”.
Telepresence may rely on rapid and effortless perceptual acceptance, as
implied by Lombard and Ditton’s (1997) definition of telepresence as
“the illusion of non-mediation”, along with the idea of transparency in
the use of technology. We include a consideration of work by Merleau-
Ponty on perception, and Heidegger’s concepts of technology and trans-
parency. The purpose is to draw attention to theories of relevance to the
question: why can we have a telepresence experience—an experience of
being there in another place—and how can we account for what it is
theoretically?
The Nature of Experiences, and of Experiences of Other Places
Experience is an elusive term, often used without an explanation of what is
meant. According to John Dewey (1922, 1925, 1938), experiences arise
from the interaction a person has with his or her environment and is a
process mediated in a cultural and social context. Experiences are situated;
“In actual experience, there is never any such isolated singular object or
event; an object or event is always a special part, phase, or aspect, of an
environing experienced world - a situation”. (Dewey, 1938: 67).
Heinemann (1941), with reference to the empiricist school founded
by Philinos of Kos in Alexandria, distinguishes between three sorts of
experiences. These are: “immediate experience, mediated experience (that
is observation made by others before us), and analogous experience (thus in
case of illness which has not been observed it may be useful to compare similar
cases)”. Heinemann, in his discussion, refers to J. A. H. Murray (Oxford,
1817) who distinguished between to have an experience of, to learn by
experience, and to try something, a tentative experience. Regarding the
first of these “(i) To have, experience of; to meet with; to feel; to suffer; to
undergo. We could call this immediate experience; it covers what we imme-
diately feel or undergo during the course of our life” (Heinemann, 1941:
570).
There is also a cognitive element to experience. Experiences result from
knowledge, but experiences also include perceiving through the senses, as
well as feeling, and doing. Logue (2009: 9) define perceptual experience
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as “experience associated with sense modalities (vision, hearing touch, smell
and taste) in virtue of which it appears to one that one’s environment is a
certain way”. The emphasis is on the word of . Therefore, a perceptual
experience is a matter of a certain sort of relation between the subject
of the experience and what the experience is of, that is the object of the
experience. The term “experience” is used in many domains in a more
applied manner, directly relevant to our main topic. Researchers such as
Gallarza and Gil (2008) observe that “experiences” are a dominant focus
of tourism and tourism research. Also, in consumer behaviour studies it
is a frequently used term, as in the “experience economy” (Pine II &
Gilmore, 1998). In work on the experience economy it is regarded as
being a multi-dimensional concept.
In most cases we assume that we perceive the world as it is. This is the
layman’s perspective on the world. There are exceptions, but in everyday
life we normally do not question this—our ordinary conception of percep-
tion is what we experience with our senses. Robinson (2012: 618) writes,
“It is, I think, universally agreed that, pre-philosophically, we are all naïve
direct realists”. What if the experience is mediated by technology? Should
we then use this common-sense view on perception (Hudson, 2012)? Nöe
and Thompson (2004: 17) write that perceptual experience is extraordi-
narily complicated, particularly if one realises that such experience involves
a “temporally extended, active, and attentional encounter with the environ-
ment” where “the content of experience is brought forth or enacted by this
activity”.
The answer we give to this question has implications for the study of
digital travel and the telepresence phenomenon. One of the motivations
for this research was to explore the theoretical question of how to under-
stand a visual experience in a digital environment (a VR or other kinds of
digital media) as a perceptual experience (our emphasis).
The Philosophy of Perceptual Experience
The French philosopher René Descartes is often cited in publications
on telepresence. Descartes postulated a separation, a dualism, between
res extensa, (objects located outside the mind) and res cogitans (objects
located within the mind). This is referred to as the Cartesian view. Res
extensa is the substance of which the material world is made, while res
cogitans is the substance of consciousness, the non-material, the thinking
entity. According to Descartes res cogitans and res extensa interact in the
brain, and are located in the centre of the brain (Velmans, 1995). Very
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often the mind–body problem is traced back to René Descartes and many
leave out a reference to Galileo Galilei and his influential book the Assayer
(Galilei, 1623). This is surprising, because in his book Galileo posits a
separation between the external world and the mental world, what he
calls secondary properties (Manzotti, 2006a). Galileo Galilei published
his book 14 years before Descartes’ “Discourse on the Method of Rightly
Conducting the Reason, and Seeking Truth in the Sciences” (1637).
Many have struggled with the mind–body problem (Biocca, 1997). It
concerns the relationship between the mind, perceptions and the senses.
And why is it a problem? Let us, for a moment, describe telepresence as
a conscious state. Then, to use Thomasson’s argument “difficulties arise
given the fact that we may have conscious states that present the world as
having certain colours, tones, or smells, even when there is no external object
possessing these features at all - indeed even when there is no object being
perceived” (Thomasson, 2008: 198). The hard question concerns the rela-
tionship that exists between the objective reality of the world around us
and the subjective reality of human experience.
The philosopher McGinn (1989) writes that we cannot resolve the
mystery of the mind–body problem, the limits of our minds (to under-
stand this) are not the limits of reality and that reality be constrained by
what the human mind can conceive. The mind–body problem is not only
discussed in philosophy. It is of relevance for cognitive psychology, and
all fields that investigate how the mind works and perception. Therefore,
the mind–body problem has relevance for how to understand the telep-
resence phenomenon (Biocca, 1997). This is the backdrop for the first
research question: “Is the telepresence experience, a mediated experience,
similar to or different from the perceptual unmediated experience in the
material world?”.
Four Philosophical Views on the Nature
of Perceptual Experiences
One of our main aims is to better understand the telepresence
phenomenon in relation to digital travel experiences. Few will disagree
with the statement that a user of a virtual environment has a visual
experience of what is presented in the VE. Some will argue that, with telep-
resence, there is only something digital in front of you and not something
real. Tim Crane in his discussion about the problems of perception formu-
lates these two questions: “(i) how should we account for what we see when
we see what isn’t there? And (ii) how should we account for those properties
instantiated in experiences that are not properties of objects of experience?”
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(Crane, 2006: 25). Object of experience refers to what the experience
is of, that is physical objects, but also events, olfactory and gustatory
experiences (Logue, 2009). Tim Crane is an exponent of the represen-
tational view, which many philosophers share (Macpherson, 2014), but
there are alternatives such as relationism, enactivism, naïve realism and
the sense-data view, which we briefly review in this chapter.
Many telepresence researchers use the word virtual as opposite to real,
but without any discussion of what they mean by real. In our view this is
a weakness because it has implications, for instance, for research design.
When choosing measurements or observational methods, it is important
to keep in mind the differences between these theoretical and ontolog-
ical views on perception, and whether or not the experience is veridical.
In empirical studies, when participants answer survey-questions they have
to find the questions and statement meaningful. There is not necessarily
a good correspondence between how a layperson uses a term or under-
stands the meaning of a word, and how the researcher or interviewer uses
the same term. To ask a participant to explain or distinguish between what
is real vs. what is virtual could be distracting or difficult to answer. On
the other hand, we would like to know the participant’s answer because
it may indicate the level of presence that the participant experienced.
The Representational View
In contemporary philosophy there are two common views on percep-
tion. The first is the representational or content view. Others, such as
Crane (2006) describe this view as intentionalism. Today this is the stan-
dard view in philosophy of perception (Egan, 2012); according to Kimble
(2014: 2) “representationalism in one form or another is very influential
in philosophical circles today”. The other common view is relationism.
The representational view is a very popular theory of the nature of
experience among philosophers (Macpherson, 2014), but very hard to
understand for most readers. Still, we have decided to include the repre-
sentational view because it gives the most straightforward explanation
of telepresence. According to representationalism, what we experience
are representations and the representations exist in the brain. For telep-
resence, this means that the there in being there is something purely
mental.
The following observation by Moore (1903: 25) is well known and
often quoted by representationalists. “When we try to introspect the sensa-
tion of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were
diaphanous”. Hence, visual experiences are transparent to their subjects.
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Some prefer the window or the sheet of glass metaphor to describe expe-
riences. An experience is like a window; you don’t look at it, but through
it or, according to Michael Tye, visual experience can be characterised as
sheets of glass. He writes:
Peer as hard as you like via introspection, focus your attention in any way
you please, and you will only come across surfaces, volumes, films, and
their apparent qualities. Visual experiences thus are transparent to their
subjects. We are not introspectively aware of our visual experiences any
more than we are perceptually aware of transparent sheets of glass. If we
try to focus on our experiences, we ‘see’ right through them to the world
outside. (Tye, 2007: 31)
In our view, this window or sheet of glass metaphor can be used to discuss
the essence of telepresence and of survey instruments in telepresence that
ask about what the visual experience is like.
Many philosophers, psychologists and cognitive scientists talk about
perceptual experiences, or perceptual states in general, as representations
(Nanay, 2012, 2015). According to representationalism the presentational
character of an experience is determined by the representational content
it carries; if that representational content concerns external objects and
their features, then the presentational character of that experience will
involve those objects and features (O’Sulllivan & Shroer, 2012). There-
fore, the qualitative character of our sensory experiences, that is, the
apparent objects and properties of those experiences, are merely repre-
sentational. They comprise or contain the content of those experiences
without thereby being actually instantiated in the mind (Dretske, 1995;
Lycan, 1996; Tye, 1995). Therefore, the representational content of a
sensory experience is determined by what it is about; the phenomenal
content is determined by what qualitative property it has.
A veridical experience involves two relations to two different sorts
of entities: the relation of perceiving to the objects of experience,
which are entities like objects, events and the properties of such enti-
ties; and the relation of perceptually representing a proposition (Logue,
2009). Philosophers who speak of perception and representation in this
way include Burge, Byrne, Chalmers, Crane, Dretske, Harman, Hill,
Peacocke, Searle, Siegel and Tye (Dyrstad, 2012).
There are different versions of representationalism. For the question
of how to reason about and give explanations for the telepresence expe-
rience, the ontological perspective or stance of the author matters. Some
advocates of representationalism distinguish between vehicle and content.
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Furthermore, the vehicle of representation is what does the representing
while the content is what is being represented or what is supposed to be
represented. Vehicle representationalism claims that phenomenal proper-
ties are properties of the vehicles of representation rather than properties
of the external objects of perception.
In speaking about representations, then, we must be clear whether we
are talking about content or vehicle, about what is represented or the
representation itself. It makes a big difference. In the case of mental repre-
sentations, the vehicle (a belief or an experience) is in the head. Content -
what is believed and experienced—is (typically) not. (Dretske, 2003: 68)
Furthermore, experiences and beliefs are conscious, not because you are
conscious of them, but because you are conscious with them (Dretske,
1993: 281). This is also called a one-level view. Consciousness is funda-
mentally a matter of awareness of a world and does not require awareness
of our own minds, mental states or the phenomenal character of these
(Thomasson, 2008).
There is a form of representationalism that can be named indirect
realism in which the basic idea is that the brain constructs representations.
We perceive appearances, and, in virtue of perceiving these appearances,
we perceive the worldly item corresponding to the appearances. Kriegel
(2009) holds this view and writes “perception is mediated in the sense that
objective... reality is perceived through, or in virtue of, the perception of
something like a realm of appearances ’’ (Kriegel, 2009: 96).
A representation both brings the mind in perceptual touch with the
world and provides the basic form of representation of it, a represen-
tation that serves as “input” to belief and knowledge (Dyrstad, 2012).
Perceptual states are about something and have a representational (or
intentional) content. What a mental state is about is its intentional content
or just its content. The content of perception is representational content,
where representational content is specified by a representation’s accuracy
conditions. With this in mind we can ask whether things are as they
appear. With telepresence, and, for instance, a VE, we have a digital repre-
sentation of something that could be purely fantasy, but could also be
something that is a quite accurate representation of the material world.
Finally, some have argued that illusions are not a problem for repre-
sentationalism. The argument is that phenomenal states that are illusory
or hallucinatory are like false beliefs.
“Illusions are a phenomenon easily described within a representational
model of perception. Any time our knowledge doesn’t accurately model its
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referent we say things are not as they ‘seem’ to us” (Allsop, 2010:199).
Locatelli and Wilson (2017) write that:
(Representational) views have the benefit of unifying a diverse range of
experiences, including hallucinations and illusions, with non-perceptual
states such as thoughts, beliefs, desires, imaginings, recollections and
intentional actions.
Telepresence, feeling present in a distant (or fictional) place, is an experi-
ence that some will argue has non-perceptual states. Representationalism
is the dominate view in contemporary philosophy and is of value for
researchers interested in telepresence theory, but is not often used as a
basis for empirical work. However, in philosophy there are alternatives
such as relationism, enactivism and the sense-data view.
Relationism
The fundamental idea behind the relational view (also referred to as the
object view or the disjunctive view) is that perception makes the world
itself manifest to the mind (Crane, 2006). The identity of a visual state is
constituted by the physical facts it is about. As Crane puts it: “in percep-
tual experience I am not aware of qualities of my experience; I have the
experience, and in having the experience, I become aware of the world”
(Crane, 2006: 6). Perception is a direct relation of acquaintance between
a subject and an object in the external world. Perceptions are psycholog-
ically unmediated in that perceptual contact with the world is achieved
through a psychological state that is, in itself, perceptual. Furthermore,
“the qualitative character of experience is constituted by the qualitative
character of the scene perceived” (Campbell, 2002: 114). Snowdon (1980),
Putnam (1994), Campbell (2002), Travis (2004), Martin (2004), Brewer
(2006), among others, advocate relationism.
McDowell (1994, 2008) is primarily interested in the epistemology of
perception. His position—a variety of relationism—is referred to as epis-
temological disjunctivism. There are two other versions of disjunctivism.
They are J. M. Hinton’s and Paul Snowdon’s experiential disjunc-
tivism, and M. G. F. Martin’s phenomenal disjunctivism. (Haddock &
Macpherson, 2008). The experiential version is about the nature of expe-
rience or more precisely, about perceptual states. Martin (2013) prefers
the label evidential disjunctivism. However, according to Locatteli (2016)
the term phenomenological disjunctivism is most commonly used.
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Often illusions and hallucinations are commented on in discussions of
these philosophical standpoints and theories. Soteriou (2010) writes that
in a disjunctivist theory of perception, veridical perceptions and halluci-
nations differ mentally in some significant respect. This is because there
are certain mental features that veridical perceptions have that hallucina-
tions cannot have. Disjunctive views analyse visual experience properties in
terms of success properties. In the bad cases, the non-veridical cases, they
deny that we have the relevant success properties (Pautz, 2010). Brewer
(2008: 173) seeks to accommodate illusions inside a relational framework.
He argues: “there can be a ‘visually relevant similarity’ between a veridical
and a non-veridical percept”.
One difference, according to Soteriou (2010) between disjunctivist
approaches, is the issue of whether veridical perception should be char-
acterised as involving a relation to facts in the subject’s environment, or
whether veridical perceptions should, rather, be characterised as involving
a relation to objects, events and their properties. McDowell adopts the
former approach, whereas Campbell, Brewer and Martin adopt the latter.
Furthermore, Martin argues that a disjunctive naïve realist view is the
best error theory concerning perceptual experience and the introspection
of experience (Soteriou, 2010).
The ordinary person’s view of perception is naïve realism. It can also
be named the common-sense view or the default view because it simply
endorses the way in which experience subjectively strikes us; we intuitively
take our experience to be an experience of worldly objects (Locatelli,
2016). Logue (2009) contends that naïve realism is in the vicinity of
relationism. According to Logue (2011: 269): “Naïve realism…. holds
that veridical perceptual experiences fundamentally consist in the subject
perceiving physical entities in her environment”. Naïve realists argue that
sensory experiences are relations to mind-independent objects (Martin,
2004) and “Perceiving is …. a matter of the conscious presentation of actual
constituents of physical reality themselves’ ’ (Brewer, 2006: 172). Another
version of relationism that deserves additional attention is enactivism.
Enactivism
Enactivism (or enactive realism) became known to a wider audience
through the book The Embodied Mind (Varela et al., 1991). Enactivism
holds that perception is the recognition of sensorimotor contingencies,
a law-like connection between our actions and resultant sensory input.
According to Manzotti (2011) enactivism builds upon the work of other
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scholars such as Gregory Bateson (1972), James J. Gibson (1972) and
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962).
Enactive realism is based on two central principles (Roberts, 2012):
(1) “perception consists in perceptually guided action” and (2) “cogni-
tive structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable
action to be perceptually guided” (Varela et al., 1991: 173). The enactive
approach rejects the classical dichotomy between perception and action.
The argument is that experiences are inseparable from the perceiver’s
bodily activities. According to enactivism, perception is not something
that passively happens on us, but something we actively do. Furthermore,
the human mind is embodied in our entire organism and embedded in the
world. With reference to Merleau-Ponty, Varela, Thompsen and Rosch
write “the subject is inseparable from the world, but from a world which the
subject itself projects” (Varela et al., 1991: 4).
How does enactivism view perception? Roberts (2012: 239) writes:
The enactive realist approach contends…: all perceptual contact, and hence
all perceptual consciousness, is critically dependent upon the possession
and exercise of cognitive states and abilities. The perceptual relation, on
this view, is to be analyzed as a relation of informed, skillful, and active
exploration that cannot be instantiated unless the subject of experience is
equipped with the right kind of bodily expertise.
The emphasis is on actions and interactions with the environment, and
what happens when we act. “Experience isn’t something that happens in
us, it is something we do” (Nöe, 2004: 216). Perception is from this
perspective an active exploration of the environment and an interaction
with the world. Enactivists argue that the core features of experiential
properties are best explained by appeal to specific patterns of sensori-
motor activity, through which complex self-organizing systems interact
with aspects of their environment (Hutto, 2011). Perceptual presence
is the sense we have of the perceptual accessibility via bodily movement
(Bower & Gallagher, 2016).
According to Roberts (2012: 240):
Enactive realism claims that physical entities, scenes, and events bear
multiple, objectively-specifiable properties, all of which are possible objects
of perception, but not all of which are available to every perceiver. Percep-
tual accessibility (our emphasis) is determined not simply by physiology.
Visual accessibility is not dependent solely upon the constitution of the
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visual system, for example, nor by sensory input, but by what the perceiver
knows, which determines what she is able to apprehend in experience.
Therefore, perceptual presence is a matter of access (Nöe, 2008) and we
have access to more than what projects on the retina. Perceptual expe-
rience is an encounter made possible by our possession and exercise of
understanding; it is a skilled-based access to what is there.
In support of a sensorimotor approach to perception, Kevin O’Regan
(2011) argues that vision is a way of manipulating the environment, an
exploratory activity, one motivated and sustained by our interest in our
world. Limbeck-Lilienau (2013: 40) write:
Enactivism is not only a thesis about perceptual content, but also a thesis
about the qualitative character of perceptual experience…..The enactive
approach conceives perception as an activity, a form of doing or acting,
sensorimotor knowledge and practical sensorimotor skills are constitutive
for perception.
There has been some discussion of virtual presence by enactivists. For
example, to Nöe (2004), virtual content refers to any aspects of objects
which are available to perceptual experience without direct, occurrent
perception (see also Keefer, 2009). He also discusses virtual presence and
states, for example: “we have the impression that the world is represented in
full detail in consciousness because, wherever we look, we encounter detail.
All the detail is present, but it is only present virtually(our emphasis), for
example, in the way that web site’s content is present on your desktop”. (Nöe,
2004: 49)
Telepresence concerns visual experiences. Interaction and action play
a key role in this experience. In one of the earliest and most influen-
tial papers in telepresence, Steuer’s (1992) Defining Virtual Reality, the
author discusses the two dimensions of telepresence vividness and interac-
tivity. To him these two dimensions constitute the representational powers
of the technology.
The Sense-data View
British philosopher George Moore (1903) introduced the sense-data or
sense-datum theory, which is also sometimes described as a theory of
visual appearance (Snowdon, 2014). When the term sense data was intro-
duced at the beginning of the last century it was a neutral term with
regard to the objects of perception. Moore distinguished between the
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sense datum, which is given to the mind, and the sensation, which is
the act or event of being aware of the datum. Furthermore, sense data
are mind-dependent, non-physical objects (Price, 1932). The argument
is that sense data exist whenever a person perceives anything, by any of
the senses, and also whenever a person has an experience qualitatively like
perceiving, such as a hallucination. Sense data have, according to Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Huemer, 2011), three defining characteristics;
(1) sense data are the kind of thing we are directly aware of in percep-
tion, (2) sense data are dependent on the mind and 3) sense data have
the properties that perceptually appear to us.
The sense-data theory claims that when we have a perceptual experi-
ence we are immediately aware of non-physical, mind-dependent objects
called sense data, and shares a commitment to the idea that the struc-
ture of experience is relational. According to this view there is no
mind-independent physical world responsible for the regularity of our
perceptual experiences (Foster, 2000, 2008). But “whenever a sensible
quality is present in experience, there must be an object which instantiates
this quality” (Crane, 2005: 253). A sense experience is to be understood
as a kind of sensing, where sensing is, or at least affords, awareness of
something. When one focuses on one’s experience, one “sees through it”
and becomes aware of a sense datum (Moore, 1903). According to Austin
(1962: 2): “we never directly perceive or sense, material objects or material
things, but only sense-data”. Objects are private mind-dependent entities
and sense data are not located in physical space. We see physical things
mediated by virtue of seeing real sensory items that we take to correspond
to those physical things (Gandarillas, 2011). Sense data are non-physical
objects in the mind that we are aware of (Macpherson, 2014).
Sensing is, or at least affords, awareness of something. Moreover,
experiences are essentially presentational (Price, 1932). The presenta-
tional character of a visual experience is determined not by the external
objects/properties that are the subject matter of our perceptual beliefs
but by properties of sense data (O’Sullivan & Schroer, 2012). The sense-
datum theory takes perceptual consciousness to consist in an awareness of
objects, but the objects in question are not the familiar denizens of the
physical world, but are instead special, non-physical objects of a markedly
peculiar character (Alston, 1999). Awareness of external objects can only
be indirect. Item-awareness is a thesis about the objects of experience:
whenever one has a visual experience, even if it is hallucinatory, there is
something of which one is visually aware (Pautz, 2007). Therefore, there
is no appearance-reality distinction.
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Sense-datum theorists are indirect realists. According to indirect
realism, perception is a triadic relation between perceiver, a physical object
that is perceived indirectly, and some private entity that is perceived
directly (Brown, 1992). Perceptual access to the external or mind-
independent world is indirect, relegated to the knowledge acquired
through the representational capacities of sense data (Brown, 2012). Indi-
rect realist can say that sense data are the medium by which we perceive
the mind-independent world, and no more create a “veil of perception”
than the fact that we use words to talk about things creates a veil of words
between us and the things we talk about (Crane, 2011). Veil of percep-
tion is the idea that all one is immediately aware of is one’s perceptual
experience of external objects, not the objects themselves. According to
Huemer (2011) veil of perception is closely related to skepticism as it
empties perception of content. He further states, in a later publication
(Huemer, 2011: 1) that:
Many philosophers have rejected the notion of sense data, either
because they believe that perception gives us direct awareness of phys-
ical phenomena, rather than mere mental images, or because they believe
that the mental phenomena involved in perception do not have the
properties that appear to us.
Summary of the Four Theories
The purpose of this review has been to introduce philosophical theories
and arguments of relevance to the questions of what are and why do we
have telepresence experiences.
Table 2.1 summarises key characteristics of the philosophical theories
reviewed above.
On the one hand, it is important to understand that we use words,
terms and concepts that come from philosophy. On the other, we might
not use (or be able use) the terms in accordance with how they are used
in one of these four philosophical theories. Still, in order to reflect on
the question of what a telepresence experience is, it is relevant to notice
that there are some major differences between these four and how they
account for or explain perception, as shown in Table 2.1.
In the next subsection we discuss insights from decision-making and
the distinction between a fast, intuitive system and a slower reasoning
system. Many choice studies in decision science focus on how we (some-
times) automatically accept information. Insights from these studies can
help us to reflect on why we can have telepresence experiences.
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Dual Process Theories and Intuitive Judgment
Daniel Kahneman’s, 2011 book, Thinking Fast and Slow, on the
psychology of judgment and decision-making, is highly cited. However,
the publications by Evans, Stanovich and West are even more important
for the development of the dual process view. It was Stanovich (1999,
Stanovich & West, 2000) who first labelled the two types of cognitive
processes system 1 and system 2. This was based on Jonathan Evans work
in the 1970s and 1980s.
System 1 is rapid, intuitive, automatic and effortless, while system 2
is slow and controlled (Kahneman, 2003). Intuitions can be described
as “thoughts and preferences that come to mind quickly and without
much reflection” (Kahneman, 2002). Although intuitive judgments can be
viewed as an extension of perception to judgment, the distinction between
perception and judgment is often blurry (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005).
For system 1, the content level is characterised as percepts, something
recognised by the senses. Kahneman and Frederick (2002) used the terms
intuitive vs. reflective to characterise the two systems. In this research
field, there is not an extensive discussion of illusion, but with reference
to Gigerenzer (1991) Kahneman and Frederick write “there is no mystery
about the conditions under which illusions appear or disappear: An intuitive
judgment will be modified or overridden if System 2 identifies it as biased”.
Although many researchers know about the theoretical contributions
of Sloman (1996), Stanovich (1999), Kahneman and Fredericks (2002)
and Kahneman (2002, 2003) on the two modes of thoughts, there is one
question that is hard to answer that has to do with the interaction or
interplay between the two systems. What is it that can explain or evoke
the use of system 2, and the transition between the two systems? Can
we control or choose between the two, and how does this relate to the
telepresence (and the digital travel) experience?
The Spinozan Model of Rapid Acceptance Response
Dual process theory argues that in system 1 thoughts and preferences
come to mind quickly and without reflection. Spinoza suggested that
people believe every assertion they understand, but quickly un-believe
those assertions that are found to be at odds with other established facts
(Gilbert, 1989). Spinoza argued that to comprehend a proposition, a
person has to implicitly accept that proposition; only later, if the person
realised that this proposition conflicted with some other, might he or she
change his or her mind (Gilbert, 1991).
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Richter et al. (2009) refer to the notion of an initial acceptance of
information as the dual-stage model of comprehension and validation.
Few have tried to test the Spinozan belief procedure. However, there are
experiments that indicate that people might be able to validate and reject
false information early in information processing when they have relevant
background knowledge, see Trope and Gaunt (2000), Schul et al., (2004)
and Richter et al. (2009).
The following quote from Gerard (1997: 332) summarises the
Spinozan Model (see Fig. 2.1): “perception is quintessentially Spinozan;
a percept is immediately believed. Only in the case of rare illusions are our
senses tricked into believing what is not there or in to not believing what
is there”. It is a short step from the Spinozan belief procedure to the
telepresence experience.
Type 1 processing is a common processing default (Stanovich et al.,
2011). A main factor that explains this is the computational ease of system
1. When a user reports “I had a feeling of being there”, that is in a place
in a virtual environment, it might be this fast, automatic system 1 process
that contributes to and explains why the user reports that they had the
feeling of being there.
Fig. 2.1 The disposition to accept propositions—The Spinozan model
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Table 2.2 Characteristics of System 1 and System 2 thinking
System 1 System 2
Intuitive: Preconscious, automatic and
intimately associated with affect
Rational: Conscious, deliberative and
affect-free
Concrete: Encodes reality in images,
metaphors and narratives
Abstract: Encodes reality in symbols,
words and numbers
Rapid processing: Oriented towards
immediate action
Slower processing: Capable of long
delayed action
Resistant to change: Changes with repetitive
or intense experience
Less resistant to change: Can change
with speed of thought
Integrated: Situationally specific; organised in
part by cognitive-affective modules
Experienced actively and consciously:
We believe we are in control of our
thoughts
Self-evidently valid: “Experiencing is
believing”
Not Self-evident: Requires
justification via logic and evidence
Externally focused: Mental presence in the
world
Internally focused: Mental absence
from the world
In discussing the psychology of presence (and telepresence), Water-
worth and Riva (2014) characterised the two processes as shown in Table
2.2. According to them, presence can be characterised as the result of
intuitive processing.
From judgment and decision theory we now turn to an influential
philosopher of the twentieth century, Martin Heidegger. We can ask:
how do we interact with and in the world, and what is the role of
the body? Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, his hammer metaphor
and his concepts present-at-hand and ready-to-hand remain important
contributions to this discourse.
Everyday Activities in the World:
Transparency and Embodiment
To carry out activities in the world requires embodiment, and is also
closely related to the sense of being and of telepresence. Normal, everyday
activities need to be, and are, executed frequently and seamlessly. We use
our bodies in the world without the need for conscious reflection on how
we use them, or even that we are using them. This is one interpretation of
the notion of transparency in embodiment, and in the use of our bodies
and of the tools with which we often carry out our activities in the world.
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This notion of transparency can be extended to account for the seam-
less use of digital systems, and the as-if-unmediated experience of digital
media.
Heidegger and Modes of Engaging with the World
Everyday activities are the starting point for Heidegger’s philosophy. We
have a primary and pragmatic interaction with things and the body plays
a central role. To him the world is at hand in an almost literal sense.
Heidegger (1927) distinguished between a tool being ready-to-hand and
being present-at-hand. His famous example is the hammer which, while in
use, is ready-to-hand. It is important to notice that ready-to-hand is not
an object of conscious reflection. Packer (1985: 1084) summarises this in
the following manner: “the kind of access of the ready-to-hand mode such as
emotions, habitual practices, and skills is radically distinct from the access to
phenomena provided by theoretical reflection…. (The ready to hand mode)
is the mode of direct practical engagement in which we actually do much of
our everyday living”.
In human–computer interaction (HCI) and usability studies, many
researchers cite Heidegger, probably due to this practical interpretation of
technology as a tool. Figure 2.2 presents some of Heidegger’s concepts
with citations that explain the core meaning of the terms.
We can also see Heidegger’s concepts as being on different levels of
abstraction—see Fig. 2.3. The highest level is the ontological level, the
level that incorporates and unifies the lower levels. It is with the concepts
on the lower levels that Heidegger explains how we as humans interact,
relate to and perceive the world.
Heidegger does not use the term transparency in the specific meaning
related to use. For Heidegger Durchsichtigkeit has a more general scope
than mere contact with technology or tools (Van Den Eede, 2011). To
Heidegger circumspection, Umsicht, is the skilled possibility of concerned
discovering, of concerned seeing. The term denotes the circumstances
and the situation of our behaviour and how we understand the world we
live in. Herstad (2007: 97) writes: “Circumspection can be interpreted as a
kind of awareness which enables users to see equipment, but without asserting
characteristics and properties of the equipment in use, as is the case when an
object outside of a use context is seen”. Herstad, therefore, suggests the
term circumspective use in order to avoid an either/or visible/invisible
dichotomy that too often leads to a lack of understanding of the situation
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Fig. 2.2 Heidegger and modes of engaging in the world
and context of use. The reason why Heidegger’s theory has relevance for
VR and telepresence primarily has to do with the transparency or semi-
transparency characteristic of the ready-at-hand experience.
Researchers in telepresence (e.g. Winograd, 1995; Zahorik & Jension,
1998; etc. Benyon 2012; Sheridan 1999; Turner and Turner (2009,
2012; Turner & Turner 2006)) refer to Heidegger’s concepts, but do
not discuss ready-to-hand in any detail. It is also rare to find researchers
that use Heidegger’s concepts in empirical studies.
In their paper Presence as Being-in-the-World, Zahorik and Jenson
(1998) emphasis action as being in the centre of existence. Their thesis
is that presence is tied to action in the environment. Söffner (2006:
25) gives credit to Zahorik and Jension in this passage: “Convinc-
ingly in the beginning these authors put forth a definition of presence as
‘being-in-the-world’. In introducing Martin Heidegger’s thoughts about
‘thrownness’ (Geworfenheit) and ‘readiness-to-hand’ (Zuhandenheit) into
presence theory, they allow for a distinction between presence as existence
in a worldly context defined as state of acting on the one hand, and on
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Fig. 2.3 Dasein and levels of abstraction
the other interpretation requiring stable (mental) representation that takes
place necessarily outside action”. Söffner advocates a view similar to Floridi
who defines telepresence as an “epistemic failure”.
Transparency
Surprisingly, very few authors emphasise the transparency aspect in rela-
tion to technologically mediated experiences, although there are excep-
tions. For instance, Riva (2009: 166) writes: “Following Heidegger,
the medium is ready-to-hand”. When someone has a feeling of being
there, the medium is transparent. In her article The remote body, Dolezal
(2009) discusses telepresence based on ideas and concepts from Husserl,
Merleau-Ponty, Sartre and Gallagher. Dolezal (2009: 216) argues: “The
achievement of transparency in the case of manipulating a technological
object is of particular interest in the case of telepresence”.
Don Ihde (2010), a philosopher of science and technology, builds on
Heidegger’s tool analysis when he discusses transparency. He argues that
technology must be transparent enough, not wholly transparent, but “the
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closer to invisibility, transparency, and the extension of one’s own bodily sense
this technology allows, the better”. (Ihde, 1990: 74).
We can ask: what is it that is transparent? The technology, yes, but
not only the technology. Van den Eede (2011: 157) made a summary of
philosophical theories discussing the transparency concept and ICT and
asserts: “from a use (or designer’s, or engineer’s) viewpoint, awareness of
the technological mediation must be as low as possible. From a context (or
individual’s, or reformer’s, or victim’s) viewpoint, consciousness of it should
be as great as can possibly be accomplished. From a theorists’ viewpoint,
however, some form of double vision should be developed, where both sorts
of transparency come in view—otherwise we risk to overlook either one or the
other”.
Some researchers prefer the term visible/invisible to transparency.
Weiser (1991) used this as a core concept and to him, the goal is to make
ICT-systems objectively visible but subjectively invisible. He states that:
“A good tool is an invisible tool. By invisible, I mean that the tool does not
intrude on your consciousness; you focus on the task, not the tool”. (Weiser,
1994).
Embodiment
We have reviewed enactivism, a theory that puts emphasis on bodily activ-
ities. It was influenced by Merleau-Ponty’s work as well as Heidegger’s.
Merleau-Ponty does not explicitly mention Heidegger in his writings,
but he has a reference to Heidegger’s notion Dasein (Matthews, 2002).
Merleau-Ponty places the body at the centre of his ontology, the world
as we experience it. He writes: “I am conscious of the world through the
medium of my body” (1962: 94–95). It is from the body that I perceive the
world. Without a body, I have no place from which to perceive the world.
‘Where is’ begins with the location of the body. It locates me in a place”.
He writes: “my existence as subjectivity is merely one with my existence as
a body and with the existence of the world, and because the subject that I
am, when taken concretely, is inseparable from this body and this world”
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 408). He uses the term sentir to denote a sense
experience and the term coping to signify how a person is able to respond
to particular situations.
By his view, the body is both the generating and the enduring aspect
of experience, and an embodied consciousness (Moya, 2014). Merleau-
Ponty (1962: 148) writes: “Our body is not primarily in space, it is of
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it and the body knows how to perceive … it knows how to act”. Human
subjectivity is essentially an embodied phenomenon, and there is a circular
interplay between the three; body–mind–world. For instance, we have
learned from our experience how to find our way around in a city. This is
“sedimented in” how that city looks to us (Dreyfus, 2007: 10). Merleau-
Ponty calls this feedback loop between the embodied “coper” and the
perceptual world, the intentional arc. He writes: “Cognitive life, the life
of desire or perceptual life – is subtended by an intentional arc which
projects round about us our past, our future, (and) our human setting”
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 36). Therefore, there is a close connection and an
interaction between the human body and the world. According to Fischer
and Hencke (1996) Merleau-Ponty might have been influenced by Jean
Piaget (1930) who described how we relate to the world as the cycle of
action, assimilation and adaptation.
Merleau-Ponty’s is also known for the example of the blind man’s cane,
concerning how we relate to the world. A blind man perceives the world
through his cane. This is a skill that has to be learned and is a way of
actively probing his environment. When he walks down the street, he is
not primarily aware of the cane; instead he is aware of the curb. Like
all other perception, it is an active communion with the world. In the
context of telepresence and mediated experiences, the screen or the game-
console is the cane. The device becomes part of the here-body experience
(Ihde, 2002). Likewise, Merleau-Ponty (1962) argues that tools func-
tion as an extension of the body. To Merleau-Ponty the body itself is the
perceiving subject and “sight and movement are specific ways of entering
into relationship with objects” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 37). Commenting
on this statement, Svanaes (2000: 103) writes: “any theory that locates
visual perception in the eyes alone does not do justice to the phenomenon, and
that it is meaningless to talk about the perceptual process of seeing without
reference to all the senses”.
To Merleau-Ponty (1962) the most immediate and essential aspects of
the lived dimension of space are sensory experiences. In his main work
The Phenomenology of Perception he reasons as follows: “by thus remaking
contact with the body and with the world we shall rediscover our self, since,
perceiving as we do with our body, the body is a natural self and, as it were,
the subject of perception” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 239). Nesheim (2011:
29) writes, after reviewing Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology: “Our bodies
are equipped with an extensive set of sensors that allow us to see, smell, hear
touch, taste and move in connection with our surrounding”. Following
from this, we consider the senses and their role further below.
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Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the body is a theory of perception empha-
sising perceptual awareness (Talero, 2005: 20). To Merleau-Ponty (1962:
229): “the senses intercommunicate by opening on to the structure of the
things”. Therefore, he did not perceive qualities of other parts of percep-
tion purely in themselves, but in their integrated relation with other parts
(Shores, 2012). In his later writings, Merleau-Ponty reflects on vision and
touch. His thesis is that vision, touch and movement are intertwined; we
see only what we look at. “What would vision be without eye movement?
And how could the movement of the eyes not blur things if movement were
blind? If it were only a reflex?” Merleau-Ponty (1964: 162). The idea of a
touching look should be taken literally. He argues that we should give up
the idea of isolating the senses. Vision is intermingled with movement.
There is an intrinsic relationship between my body and things around
me. Not surprisingly, Merleau-Ponty can be criticised over his views. For
instance, he is not consistent in how he uses the term embodiment.
In discussing the blind man’s use of a cane (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:
139), he writes that the cane becomes “incorporated” into the man’s body
image (p. 141), but he also writes that the cane becomes “a bodily auxil-
iary, an extension of the bodily synthesis” (p. 153). Although embodiment
is emphasised, the body as a unique field of sensory experience is often
overlooked in phenomenological investigations influenced by Merleau-
Ponty (Leder, 1990). For a further discussion of embodiment and the
blind man’s cane, see De Preester (2011).
Like “experience”, the term “embodiment” is not easy to define.
Ziemke (2003) discusses embodiment with the aim of disentangling
the different claims and notions about the concept. Although there is
disagreement about the meaning (Kiverstein, 2012; Metzinger, 2006) it
is a key term for the so-called enactive view (see Sect. “Presence and the
Direct Perception Approach”), a view that posits that perception, cogni-
tion and action are facets of a single process. As De Vignemont (2011)
commented: “Merleau-Ponty initiated a long tradition of phenomenolog-
ical investigation of bodilyawareness (Henri 1965; De Preester, 2007;
Gallagher, 2005; Legrand, 2006; Mishara, 2004; Thompson, 2005;
Zahavi & Parnas, 1998), as well as the recent sensorimotor theories
of consciousness (O’Regan and Noë, 2001; Nöe, 2004; Hurley, 1998;
Thompson, 2005)”.
In phenomenology and contemporary philosophy, embodiment is
a popular term (Gallagher, 2005, 2018; Metzinger, 2004, 2006).
Metzinger (2004) connects the concept of presence to that of trans-
parency, which refers to the fact that our perceptions of the world and of
the self appear direct, unmediated by the neurocognitive mechanisms that
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in fact give rise to them (Seth et al., 2012). Metzinger further emphasises
that what is experienced is experienced now and refers to this as nowness
and a temporal window of presence (Wittman, 2011).
Merleau-Ponty’s ideas are highly relevant to understanding the
phenomena of telepresence. Telepresence is often primarily a visual expe-
rience, but not only a visual experience. Other senses need to be invoked
and engaged in a virtual environment for a strong sense of being there
(presence in a digital environment) to be achieved. In the next subsection
we discuss work relevant to the question of whether or not our perceptual
experiences exist in the brain or outside it, with particular reference to the
experience of telepresence.
Presence and the Direct Perception Approach
Loomis asserts that presence is a basic state of consciousness consisting of
the attribution of sensation to some distal stimulus or environment. In the
inaugural issue of the Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments
he writes that a simulated environment can “be so compelling as to force a
user to question the assumptions that the physical and perceptual world are
one and the same” (Loomis, 1992: 113). Biocca (2001) suggests, based
on a philosophical grounding of a theory of presence, that presence is a
sub-problem of the science of consciousness, specifically the mind–body
problem. To him VE technologies potentially alter the interaction of the
senses and/or motor systems with energy arrays that represent invariants
of the environment such as objects, spaces and other beings.
For Biocca, presence is motivated by the desire to transcend the body
“to move beyond the limits of the body and the sensory channels” (Biocca,
1997: 13) and he calls attention to what he calls the cyborg’s dilemma:
the extension of the human senses through technology (Mennecke et al.,
2010). According to Hillis (1999: 164); “In VEs, a quasi merger of
embodied perception and externally transmitted conception happens at the
level of sensation”.
The psychologist Max Velmans (1998, 2009), who advocates a
direct perception approach, argues that human experiences occur in the
phenomenal realm. Therefore, virtual realities do not fit easily into a world
as-perceived model: “that dualists and reductionists assume that experiences
either have no location or extension or are located and extended” (p. 3). In
VR one appears to interact with a world outside one’s own body although
there is no actual and corresponding there surrounding the person.
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Embodiment provides the necessary bridge between external events
and brain events. Sensory and motor apparatuses allow the brain to be
part of a causal network linked to the external world (Manzotti, 2006b:
75). According to Velmans (1998, 2009), the VR world appears to have
3D location and extension outside one’s body in spite of the fact that it
is entirely a phenomenal experience. Therefore, VR does not seem to be
without location or extension, or to be in the brain. Perceptual processing
in the brain can result in experiences that have a subjective location and
extension beyond the brain (Velmans, 1998: 47). Pilotti (2011) argues in
a similar manner, he writes: “it is as self-evident as anything can be that
all my sensory experiences are outside the brain, in the body or in the space
around me. Touch is in the body where I feel the touch. (and) our sensory
experiences are identical with matter, not in the brain, but out there in
the now, the space or matter aspect of space–time” (Pilotti, 2011: 129).
To Merleau-Ponty (1962: 169) perception is a continuous interaction
involving the subject’s intentions, expectations and physical actions.
Mingers (2001), building on Merleau-Ponty, uses the term embodied
cognition in his works. He argues that information is objective in the sense
of being independent of the observer, but the meaning that it generates
is observer-dependent. He emphasises the importance of recognising the
embodied and situated nature of human cognition and action. The intran-
sitive (ontological) dimension is the domain of the real objects of scientific
knowledge; the transitive (epistemological) dimension is the domain of
humanly constructed cognitive objective of science such as theories,
experiments and concepts. Mingers uses the term structural coupling, a
concept that originates from Maturana and Varela’s (1980, 1987) and has
some similarities with how Merleau-Ponty describes embodiment.
Velmans (2009) writes that in everyday life we take the phenomenal
world to be the physical world, and we treat the objects and events we
perceive as if they were the objects and events themselves. “Although we
normally think of the phenomenal world surrounding our body as the ‘phys-
ical world’, it remains part of conscious experience rather than apart from
it” (Velmans, 2008: 33).
Velman’s point of view is useful since it corresponds to how individuals
can experience a VE, and describe their experience when it happens or just
after. When someone is sightseeing in a VE of a city that actually exists,
it is a predominantly visual experience, but the place is perceived as real
(Slater, 1999) or, in telepresence terminology, the person has the feeling
of being there. How long a feeling of being there lasts varies, and a user
of a VE may often have breaks in presence (Slater & Steed, 2000).
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Summary and Conclusions
To understand the experience a sense of being in a digital environ-
ment—telepresence (or mediated presence—we started this chapter by
considering how we can experience being anywhere—our perception of
being in the world. We presented different philosophical and psycholog-
ical perspectives on having the experience of being somewhere, stressing
the importance of perception. The motivation for this was to shed light on
what possible ways of understanding the experience of being in another
world was created or mediated by digital technology.
We compared four philosophical views: representationalism, rela-
tionism, enactivism and the sense-data view. Each has its strengths and
weaknesses, but relationism is best placed to accommodate perceptual illu-
sions, which is a prevalent view of the psychological nature of telepresence
experiences. Enactivism is also very relevant to understanding presence,
as it stresses that experiences are inseparable from the perceiver’s bodily
activities. Each of these approaches has something to offer and add to our
understanding of digital travel.
We also introduced dual process theories of cognition and suggested
that acceptance of the reality of an external world, in the moment, is
largely a result of intuitive, rapid cognitive processing. We emphasised
the Spinozan nature of this view, which also suggests that the initial,
rapid judgment may be overridden on further reflection, as we discuss
in Chapter 3.
Enactivism was heavily influenced by the works of Merleau-Ponty and
Gibson, in the light of the relationship between the world, embodi-
ment, action and perception, and how these lead into the concept of
transparency in interactions with the world, and with digitally mediated
environments. We stressed the importance of Merleau-Ponty’s view of
how we perceive the world with our bodies. Digitally or not digitally, this
is a basic characteristic of human experience.
Direct perception accounts of presence are appealing in the way
embodiment is seen as linking mind and body, with perception under-
stood as happening “out there”, not in the brain, both for perception
of the physical world and of compellingly rendered virtual world. This
a key idea for understanding how digital travel can be experienced as
perceptually real.
As suggested by enactivism and the direct perception approach, the
possibilities for action in the world are important to the nature of our
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experience of places. This, in turn, is influenced by the characteristics of
the world in which we act, through what are known as affordances.
These topics are taken up in Chapters 4 and 5 in the context of digital
travel and related experiences of place and telepresence.
A subjective experience of being there at a place experienced in the
moment can be accounted for theoretically with reference to the theo-
retical positions reviewed in this chapter. A travel experience—whether
physical or digital—will also include the memory of trip, the after-travel
experience. When reflecting on a digital travel experience, we will most
likely conclude that it was not actual travel. But we can still have a vivid
memory of what it was like to be there, if the conditions for successful
digital travel have been met.
In the light of the discussions presented in this chapter, the next
chapter (Chapter 3) focuses more specifically on views of telepresence,
which provide a ground for discussing the related concepts of virtual
tourism, place theory and relevant areas of marketing and hedonistic
consumption research.
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CHAPTER 3
Feeling Present in Virtual Environments
Abstract We compare and contrast different current theoretical accounts
of telepresence, including presence as a pretence (a simulation of reality),
as pretending (making believe the virtual world is real), as a perceptual
illusion (“the illusion of non-mediation”), and as embodied attention to
the surrounding (or apparently surrounding) environment. These views
are well-accepted in the field, and can be seen as contributing to a virtual
travel experience, which is a kind of illusion. When we feel highly present,
we believe in the perceived world in which we experience ourselves to
be—it is in that moment real to us. Creating that effect is a key part of a
convincing digital travel experience. To have that experience, we must be
attending to the digital world, feeling as if we are physically surrounded
by it. Our imaginations are involved in how we perceive our surroundings,
and in how we conceptualise being there.
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Imagination
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Introduction
In Chapter 2 we reviewed perspectives on how we can perceive ourselves
to be present in the world. For digital travel to be possible, it is neces-
sary to feel present in another place. That is, to feel present in a different
place, real or fictional, that is not the place in which the observer is phys-
ically located. This is a place that is perceived as being present but is
a product of, or in some way mediated by, digital technology. In this
chapter the main focus is on this experience of being present in another
place, experienced presence, particularly through the medium of interac-
tive technologies, which is termed telepresence or mediated presence (we
use these two terms synonymously). We see presence—the sense of being
present—as a general human faculty to experience being somewhere, in
a particular place, and telepresence as presence elicited via digital tech-
nology. We explore several different views on the nature of presence
and telepresence, and the factors that may affect the digital traveller’s
experience of apparently being in another place, one that he is visiting.
First, we can raise the question: what’s the main difference between
physical travel and digital travel? In both, the pre-departure stage of any
journey might be very similar, and most likely mediated by digital tech-
nology; searching for places to visit, things to see and so on. And after
the event, recollecting, looking at images, telling people about memo-
ries of the trip are also quite similar—and in both cases is likely to be
at least partly digitally mediated. The story or narrative through which
the traveller plans and makes sense of the journey may be very similar in
many respects. What is most obviously different between the two is that
with digital travel, the traveller’s body can be seen as being left behind.
The body is located in a different place from the destination in which the
traveller feels herself to be—it remains at home.
Digital travel is an experience of being at a distance (from the place the
body is actually located) a form of telepresence or mediated presence. It
feels as if the body, by virtue of which the perceiver experiences the world,
travels. But, in actuality, the physical body remains at home. Telepresence
is thus a paradoxical state for the perceiver. The word has two parts. Tele
is the Greek word for at a distance and presence is about the subjective
here and now experience. Sometimes the word presence is used as a short
form of telepresence, sometimes to refer more generally to the subjective
here and now experience. Telepresence implies the use of technology, and
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is sometimes referred to as mediated, computer-mediated or technology-
mediated presence.
During the last three decades, many researchers have been interested in
telepresence. This is partly due to technological developments, in partic-
ular the gaming technology and the role that games play in our society.
In computer games there has been significant technological advancement
in recent years, in particular in photo-realistic computer graphics. As a
result, interactive technology can be used to create virtual environments
that look very much like the external world in which we live; in fact, we
might not always be able to see the difference. Social presence refers to
the salience of people other than the observer in an interaction in a virtual
environment and is an important aspect of being in a place. For example,
tourists do not only have a spatial experience of place with buildings,
nature and attractions—they meet other visitors and residents. Tourists
also interact in host–guest relations; that is, with employees of hospitality
and tourism facilities, and other people that they meet there.
A video game context can enable the perception of action in another
place when watching images on a screen while sitting in a chair. Another
example might be a website for a destination developed for marketing
purposes. In this marketing context we can ask: what is the effect of this
website on the user? An interview may reveal that one user of the website
just considers the portrayed destination to be beautiful, while another
person who looks at the same website decides it is time to book accom-
modation, find out how to get there and search for events and what
to do upon arrival. The second example corresponds to the notion of
perceptible affordance that we revisit later. The question is: How do we
operationalise affordance in this kind of context? We return to this ques-
tion in Chapter 5, where we present empirical findings related to virtual
tourism.
The origin of the term “virtual reality” can be traced back to Antonin
Artaud and his seminal book The Theatre and Its Double (1938), Artaud
described theatre as “la réalité virtuelle”, a virtual reality “in which char-
acters, objects, and images take on the phantasmagoric force of alchemy’s
visionary internal dramas”. It has become common to see the two words
virtual and real in the same sentence. Often the message is that Virtual
Reality (VR) is different from real or it is the opposite of real. In most
cases there is no discussion on what it is meant by real.
Schloerb (1995) proposed that perfect telepresence occurs when the
observer cannot discriminate virtual from “actual”. Deleuze (1994: 208)
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writes “the virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual”. The
computer graphics could be accurate; that is, what the person sees corre-
sponds to how the place is in the material world when one visits the place.
Still, some will argue that it is computer graphics or VR and therefore not
real. Schloerb (1995) and then Lee (2004) suggest that sometimes it is
more appropriate to use the term actual instead of real. Another term
that can be used is face-to-face. This indicates that there is no technology
involved; no screen, images or communication through a medium. To
Schudson (1978) the unmediated conversation is the ideal fully interac-
tive experience. In many cases face-to-face may be an even more fitting
term than actual or real. In particular this is appropriate when we use
ordinary language (Etzioni & Etzioni, 1999).
Some installations or apparatus can be regarded as forerunners of
today’s VR-technology, and were made to create a telepresence experi-
ence. In 1420 the Venetian engineer Giovanni Fontana designed castellum
umbrarum, a castle of shadows (see Fig. 3.1).
Codognet (2003) describes this apparatus as a pre-cave installation and
probably one of the first known examples of VR. It has a room with walls
composed of folded screens and lighted from behind. What the person in
the room sees is moving images that convey a sense of being in a different
place.
Fig. 3.1 A section of Castellum umbrarum (Giovanni Fontana, 1420,
Bayerische Staatsbibliothek)
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Today the term telepresence is used to describe the use of technology
that allows a person to feel as if he or she is present at a place other
than the physical location. According to Marvin Minsky (1980), Patrick
Gunkel coined the term in 1979 to refer to tele-operation technology
that provides the user with a remote presence in a different physical loca-
tion via displays and feedback systems. But the concept of telepresence is
actually older and more general, referring to a feeling of presence via any
kind of digital medium, but did not emerge as a research field until the
1990s.
Conceptualisations of Telepresence:
Being Present at a Distance
In this section, we focus on a few different views of telepresence, which
can help in furthering our understanding of the nature of digital travel.
The Illusion of non-Mediation
Perhaps the most highly cited definition of presence is by Lombard and
Ditton (1997). They conceptualise telepresence as a kind of illusion, the
perceptual illusion of non-mediation. This implies that they regard telep-
resence as a property of a person. It results from an interaction between
formal and content characteristics of a medium and characteristics of the
media user, and therefore it can and does vary across individuals and
across time for the same individual. However, they do not explain or
discuss the use of the term “illusion”, which can have more than one
interpretation. In the same vein, to Riva (1999: 91) “the key issue for
developing satisfying virtual environments is measuring the disappearance
of mediation (our emphasis), a level of experience where the VR system and
the physical environment disappear from the user’s phenomenal awareness”.
This is an almost ubiquitous and very influential view of presence,
resonating with the blind man’s cane example of Merleau-Ponty (1962)
and the notion of transparency discussed in Chapter 2. The blind man
walks down the street, exploring the world with his cane. He is not
primarily aware of the cane, but of what he perceives with its active use.
In the context of telepresence and mediated presence, the medium (the
display and the input devices) correspond to the cane. The VR tech-
nology disappears for the perceiver, and becomes part of the here-body
experience (Ihde, 2002).
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Lombard and Ditton’s (1997) description of presence is appealing and
well-accepted, but has some limitations. It is essentially a formulation of
presence as “being there”, at least perceptually. We perceive we are in a
place without being distracted by the mediating technology, which has
become transparent. But is this sufficient for the presence experience? Is
it an illusion, or simply that the perceiver doesn´t notice the medium?
Pretending the Digital Is Physical
Turner and his colleagues have argued for the importance believing has
for real-world presence but for the importance of pretending (to believe)
or make-believing, for computer-mediated presence. For example, Turner
et al. (2014: 1) suggest that: “A principal, but largely unexplored, use
of our cognition when using interacting technology involves pretending. To
pretend is to believe that which is not the case, for example, when we use
the desktop on our personal computer we are pretending, that is, we are
pretending that the screen is a desktop upon which windows reside. But, of
course, the screen really isn’t a desktop”.
Turner et al. (2014) states that when we play a computer game “we
temporarily believe that we are killing aliens”. He suggests that at some
reflective level we know we are not killing aliens, but we have the vivid
experience that we are, thanks to the game technology and media content.
This seems to be another formulation of presence seen as the experiential
illusion of non-mediation, but is not what is commonly understood by
pretending. On the contrary, pretending seems to be characterised by not
believing, not by the temporary belief that a mediated experience is real.
While belief does seem to play a role in presence for both the phys-
ical world and computer-mediated environment, we suggest it is not a
prerequisite, but a consequence, of presence. The old saying “seeing is
believing” can be rephrased as presence is believing. Following Spinoza, as
discussed in Chapter 2, we can say that when we feel present in a world,
it is real for us in that moment. We believe it to be the case in the here
and now of experience, without pretending to.
When we feel presence, we may know (at some level) that the expe-
rience is not based on the body being where it is felt to be, but we do
not need to pretend to experience this as real. But people vary in terms of
how willing they are to have this experience in a digital environment. User
characteristics, such as expressed willingness to experience presence in a
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VE, affect the level of presence reported (e.g. Cummings & Bailenson,
2016; Sas & O’Hare, 2003).
Turner et al. (2014) argues for presence as make-believe from a type-2
cognitive process point of view (see our discussion of dual process theory
in Chapter 2), the result of relatively slow and deliberative thinking. But
this contradicts the idea that presence arises in situations where fast and
instinctive bodily responses (from a type-1 cognitive process) are called
for, for example, in a fast-paced computer game. As Waterworth and Riva
(2014: 38) describe presence as “the sheer subjective experience of being
in a given environment (the feeling of ‘being there’) that is the product
of an intuitive experience-based metacognitive judgment”.
Experiencing a Convincing Simulated Semblance (of Physical Reality)
By this view, presence in a VR results when the simulation elicits similar
reactions in an observer to the corresponding place in the physical world
(Slater, 2003). Presence is “the total response to being in a place, and to
being in a place with other people”. (Slater, 2002, p. 7). Slater (2009)
suggests that presence in VR is “the extent to which people respond real-
istically within a virtual environment, where response is taken at every
level from low-level physiological to high-level emotional and behavioural
responses” (p. 3555). Slater further suggests that this depends on two
illusions, the “place illusion” (PI) and the “plausibility illusion” (Psi). He
says that: “If you are there (PI) and what appears to be happening is really
happening (Psi), then this is happening to you! Hence you are likely to
respond as if it were real” (p. 3555). The key phrase here is “is really
happening”.
One is unlikely to feel much presence in a poorly rendered VR, a low-
quality simulation of reality, with unrealistic sound and a perceptible lag
between actions and the corresponding events in the virtual world. In
the physical world, the form is to a large extent given, and things behave
and respond according to our embodied and largely unconscious expec-
tations. Any measure of presence in a VR is only useful, according to this
approach, when compared to results of the same measure taken in a phys-
ical situation. The more similar the reaction in the VR is to that in the
physical world, the greater the degree of presence.
But if presence is the total response to a simulation, as compared to
the total response to the physical environment being simulated, how do
we assess presence in virtual environments that convey fictional realities?
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If no comparison with reality is involved, how can the “total response”
be quantified? This view suggests that presence is the degree of similarity
with physical reality, not a basic state of consciousness.
It seems reasonable that if the form of the physical world can be accu-
rately simulated, we will have the same experiences in the mediated world
as in the physical one. And we will have the same level of presence. But
that does not imply that the level of presence experienced in a virtual
environment is the same as the level of accuracy of the simulation, as how
well the semblance is executed. We can sometimes feel little presence in
the physical world—during a boring lecture, for example. If we accurately
simulate that experience in a virtual environment we will also feel little
presence. Therefore, presence cannot be purely a matter of experiencing
a realistic semblance of a place. But is it an illusion?
Telepresence and Perceptual Illusions
Many accounts of presence see it as resulting from some form of illusion.
The concept of illusion is closely related to that of belief. To the best of
our knowledge, Turner is the only theorist to discuss belief, which we
see this as another key concept for a more general understanding of the
characteristics of presence.
There are a number of different accounts of perceptual illusions. The
psychologist Osvaldo Da Pos (1996, 1997, 2008) distinguished between
the two kinds. The first are the psychophysical illusions that are discrep-
ancies between what we perceive, for example, redness, and the physical,
not perceivable variables, for example, wavelength, which are known to
be correlated (Da Pos, 1997: 37). The second are the phenomenological
illusions. These are discrepancies within the phenomenal world. When
these occur, the same perceived object appears at one time with some
characteristics and at another time with different characteristics.
According to Reynolds (1988) the psychological concept of illusion
can be defined as a process involving an interaction of logical and
empirical considerations. Common usage suggests that an illusion is
a discrepancy between one’s awareness and some stimulus. (Reynolds,
1988) After proposing and rejecting five definitions of illusion based on
this usage, he redefines illusion without reference to truth or falsity, as:
“a discrepancy between one’s perceptions of an object or event observed under
different conditions” (Reynolds, 1988: 217).
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Fig. 3.2 The Müller-Lyer illusion and the Necker cube
Byrne (2009) argued that there is no direct path from the persistence
of illusion to the belief-independence of experience. To him, the Müller-
Lyer illusion (see Fig. 3.2) involves a belief that one line is longer than
the other, and another, more reflective belief that they are of the same
length. This is relevant to the way presence may work; we may know,
reflectively, that what we experience in a VR is not really happening, but
our experience is that it is and, in the moment of experiencing, we may
actually believe that it is happening.
Turner et al. (e.g. 2016) makes the same point, although they equate
mediated presence with make-believing, with pretending to believe, rather
than actually believing—which reduces the coherence of his position,
unless we are pretending to experience an illusion. Turner and colleagues
state that make-believe “is a form of cognition which is decoupled from
the real world and which enables us to explore and engage with fictional
or imaginary worlds” (Turner et al., 2014).
Voss et al. (2011) posit the notion of the spectator as surrogate body.
The word Leihkörper literally means “loan body”. This concept emphasises
the basic structure of the illusion that informs the cinematic experience.
Voss et al. argue that cinema is an illusion-forming medium and that cine-
matic illusion emerges from the spectator’s engagement with the virtual
or loan body of the film. Their thesis is that it is “only the spectator’s
body, in its mental and sensorial-affective resonance with the events on-
screen, which ‘loans’ a three-dimensional body to the screen and thus flips
the second dimension of the film event over into the third dimension of
the sensing body” (2011: 145). Voss and her colleagues build on Michael
Polanyi’s (1966) work on the tacit dimension.
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As an example of a perceptual illusion, imagine that you are out late
at night, walking alone, taking a short-cut to get home. It is dark and
there seems to be no-one else around. Your walk takes you through a
particularly secluded area, perhaps a path through some woods, across a
park, or down dark and deserted streets. You wanted to get home quickly,
so you chose this route. But now you start to feel afraid. You see what
looks like the figure of a person in the middle distance, difficult to see
clearly in the darkness. You know that you have to walk close to this
figure to get home.
As you get closer, you get the clear impression that the person you
first saw vaguely from the distance is watching you, and perhaps waiting
for you to get nearer. You start to feel afraid and already you feel very
present in that environment—much more so than when you first saw “the
watcher”. You are acutely aware that you have no other way home, except
to pass the figure or turn and retrace your steps—which would take a long
time (and mean turning your back on the potential danger). You draw
closer, ever more convinced that the figure is watching you, and that he
or she has a sinister intent.
Still, you press on, heart beating fast and acutely aware of your pres-
ence in this place, with this person. Suddenly, as you get quite close
to the figure, you realise that it is not, in fact, a person at all! It is a
misshapen, sawn-off tree trunk and empty crate, with an old paper sack
that has somehow come to be attached to the top. You relax, you walk
on breathing more deeply and calmly, laughing at your own mistake,
which you replay in your mind. You will tell your friends about this funny
episode when you get home. You no longer feel afraid, or very present in
the place.
This story of the sinister watcher, who wasn’t actually there, illustrates
how we can readily misperceive our environment, seeing it in different
ways at different times, and that this can have profound effect on our
sense of presence, of being there. In this example, high presence results
from a misperception that can be understood as an illusion. But that is
not to say that presence is always an illusion, it could equally be the case
that the presence-inducing perception turned out to be the true one.
Perception (and presence) is partly a matter of hypothesis generation
and testing. When we are fearful we tend to see what our fear predicts—as
in the case of policemen mistaking a mobile phone, held by a black suspect
on a dark street, for a gun. The constructivist theory of Gregory (1970)
emphasised the importance of top-down processing to perception. While
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his view seems exaggerated in light of the clear importance of sensory
information to much of perception, when that information is ambiguous
our cognition appears to generate hypotheses about what might be out
there to guide the perceptual process. According to our three-layer model
of presence in the physical world (see Sect. 4.2, above), this corresponds
to the functioning of extended presence. Top-down processing is some-
times important—but it also results in misperceptions. Gregory (1970)
used it convincingly to explain how several perceptual illusions work,
including the ambiguous Necker cube (Necker, 1832) shown in Fig. 3.1.
Perception, Imagination and Attention
Presence depends on perception, and here we see the importance of
imagination, of top-down processing. In imagination we use metaphorical
projection to make sense of what we are perceiving. But metaphor does
not imply the use of imagination. Rather, imagination implies the use
of metaphor, so that perception—and presence—often involves the use
of metaphor. This leads us to the conclusion that our experience of any
world—physical or digital—is metaphorical, in the sense that we project
embodied image schemata (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff &
Johnson, 1988) onto what we pick up as sensations to make sense of them
as perceptions. When these sensations are generated or stimulated via an
electronic medium, they can trigger the experience of being in another
place, of a digital visit somewhere.
The top-down approach to perception of Gregory (1970) is often
contrasted with the more bottom-up approach of Gibson (1966, 1972).
According to Gibson, perception is largely “built-in”. How we perceive
things is driven, bottom-up, by innate structures. Gibson sees how we
perceive as having developed over the course of evolution, and this is how
we see our capacity for varying levels of presence experience. We resolve
this apparent contradiction by viewing the innate structures of percep-
tion (Gibson, 1972) as another way of viewing the image schemata of
Lakoff and Johnson (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson,
1988). Both reflect universal human structures of meaning in experience,
in imagination and through perception, reflecting the sense-data view and
representationalism discussed in Chapter 2.
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Presence as the Feeling of Attending to a Surrounding External World
How do we distinguish perceptions of the external world (perceptions
which may themselves be largely hypothetical mental predictions) from
the purely mental constructions that constitute imagined situations and
events? In other words, how do we separate the internally realised world
from the externally realised world? We see presence as the capacity to
make this distinction and which helps us survive in a dangerous world.
This is the purpose of presence (see Waterworth et al., 2015, for more
details).
Waterworth et al. (2015: 36 and 48; 2020: 74) define presence as “the
feeling of being located in a perceptible external world around the self”,
and “Varying feelings of presence reflect the extent to which attention
is focused on the external environment”. Presence is an experience of
being in a place, one that allows us to separate the self from the non-
self, the internal from the external, a faculty that helps us to survive.
From this perspective, an external world—whether mediated or not—
will give rise to a sense of presence, of being present in that world, in
direct proportion to the extent to which the individual pays attention
to that world. As Slater (2003) pointed out, presence should be distin-
guished from emotional engagement, but emotional engagement has an
impact on presence, through its effect on level of arousal and attentional
selection.
Attention to the external is important to presence in the physical world,
and it is similarly important for presence in mediated worlds. We also need
to believe in what is happening in a world, whether physical or not. In a
mediated world, we need to provide a convincing pretence of reality for
presence. But we need to attend to that pretence, and we need a reason
to believe that drives our attention. We are not pretending, except in the
sense that, at some level, we know the virtual reality is a simulation. But
in the moment, it is real. In the moment we see the sinister watcher, we
believe he is real. A moment later, we don’t. This is equally true in a VR
as in the physical world. Presence can be viewed as sometimes resulting
from a perceptual illusion. We need to attend for an illusion to work, but
only to the things that make it work. Perception can itself sometimes be
illusory, in so much as we perceive something that is not as we perceive
it to be.
When we feel present, we believe that what is happening is real,
whether in the physical world or a VR. We do not pretend to believe, and
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we do not make-believe as Turner suggests. Pretence is what we do when
we pay attention to fictional things, and real things too—that we know
(believe) are not what we are currently perceiving in the world around our
body. The form of the physical world is given, but ambiguous. In VR, we
can experience fictional worlds as if they are real—in fact, as real in the
moment. We believe in them and do not need to pretend that we do.
Believing in the real, in-the-moment existence of something, experienced
as being before us, is a characteristic of perception (and hallucinations;
Smith, 2002, 2010) and of presence.
Social Interaction and Affordances for Presence
Interacting with Other People
Our discussion so far has focused mainly on the individual’s experience of
spatial presence, the feeling of being there in an environment, for instance,
a physical place, other than the one in which the body is physically
located. Wirth et al. (2007: 497) out this as follows: “Spatial Presence is
…the sensation of being physically situated within the spatial environment
portrayed by the medium (“self-location”)”. According to Sanchez-Vives
and Slater (2005) the concept of spatial presence has had an impact on
our understanding of human cognition and consciousness. Spatial pres-
ence involves perceptions of perceptually real environments, while social
presence involves perceptions of social interactions with persons, places
or things (Reno, 2005). Both are important in digital travel. Social pres-
ence, as the sense of being together with another, involves factors such as
primitive responses to social cues, simulations of other minds, and auto-
matically generated models of the intentionality of the other (Biocca et al.,
2003, p. 459).
Social presence is the degree of salience or awareness of other persons
in an interaction in, for instance, a virtual environment. It is the process
by which people feel that they are in the presence of other people. Heeter
(1992) defined it as the sense of “being with others”. We can use tourists
as an example. Tourists do not only have a spatial experience of place with
buildings, nature and attractions, they often also meet other visitors and
residents of a place. Tourists specifically interact in host–guest relations;
that is, with employees of hospitality and tourism facilities, and also with
people that they meet living or visiting there.
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Horton and Wohl (1956) coined the term para-social interaction as
a label for TV viewers’ responses to people on the screen. According
to Horton and Wohl (1956: 32): “One of the striking characteristics of
the new mass media – radio, television, and the movies – is that they give
the illusion of face-to-face relationship with the performer. The conditions
of response to the performer are analogous to those in a primary group”.
Para-social interaction is related to social presence. Kumar and Benbasat
(2002) defined para-social presence as the extent to which a medium facil-
itates a sense of understanding, connection, involvement and interaction
among participating social entities. Giles (2002) argues that there is a
correlation between para-social interaction and face-to-face interaction,
but para-social interaction inevitably takes place across a distance and is
entirely constrained by social and communicative conventions.
Mirrors are not only used for seeing oneself but for seeing others. To
Umberto Eco (2000) TV, and in particular live broadcast, has similarities
with the mirror experience. Real-time TV and mirrors are prostheses of
human perception because they show things in a state of presence (Eco,
2000; Soffner, 2006).
Short, Williams and Christie (1976) developed the ideas of what they
called Social Presence Theory (SPT) in the context of telecommunica-
tions. SPT is the degree to which a person is perceived to be a “real
person” in their computer-mediated communication or virtual environ-
ments. Or, put another way, it describes the ability of communication
media to transmit social cues. The level of social presence influences the
quality of virtual interactions and outcomes. London & Hall (2011),
Roberts and Sambrook (2014), Li and Wang (2013), Wu and Zhang
(2014), Evans (2014, 2019) and Anderson et al. (2020) suggested that
social networks and Web 2.0 tools could increase social presence in
virtual business communications. The extent to which communication in
a virtual environment can convey social presence will profoundly affect the
quality of the digital travel experience, and the felt proximity wit people
and places visited digitally.
Activities in Place: The Role of Affordances
In chapter 2 we reviewed enactivism, the view that holds that senso-
rimotor skills are constitutive for perception and that experiences are
inseparable from the perceiver’s bodily activities. In this section the focus
is on the role of activity in telepresence.
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Flach and Holden (1998) were among the first scholars to investi-
gate affordance in the context of presence, by emphasising the necessity
to understand the effect of interaction with objects in virtual environ-
ments. With reference to Gibson’s theory, they write about virtual reality
(1998: 94): “From this perspective it is the dynamic interplay between
visual, acoustic, and tactile feedback and the actions of looking around and
manipulating objects that determines the fidelity of a simulation…(and)…
in virtual environments the constraints on action take precedence over the
constraints on perception”.
Why do participants tend to respond realistically to situations and
events portrayed within an immersive VR system? Slater (2009a) asks
this question and distinguishes between immersive and non-immersive
systems, arguing that in an ideal immersive system it is possible to fully
simulate normal actions in physical reality. He does not use or refer to
the term affordance in this paper, but what he calls correlation pres-
ence, which is the correlation(s) between activities and sensory feedback.
According to Slater et al. (2009b): “it seems that humans have a propensity
to find correlations between their activity and internal state and their sense
perceptions of what is going on ‘out there’”.
Presence does not demand high fidelity to physical reality, but rather
that people do respond, and are able to respond, as if the sensory data
transmitted by a medium were physically real. When aspects of our
sensory data are being generated by a virtual reality, the perceptual system
operates in exactly the same way as in an unmediated situation. The
two terms, correlational presence and affordance, are closely related; the
affordances offered by a virtual environment trigger and should support
correlation presence (Sanchez-Vives & Slater, 2005).
Gibson, a perceptual psychologist, introduced the term affordance in
his book, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (1979). His moti-
vation was to complete the ecological theory of direct perception (Dotov
et al., 2012). Since then the affordance concept has been used in a
number of disciplines other than psychology, notably human–computer
interaction (Hartson, 2003; Norman, 1999). Gibson claimed that we
perceive objects as having properties of what we ought to do with them
and attributes full normativity to affordances. Affordances are not prop-
erties of what we should do with an object, but what we can do with
it. User interfaces can offer perceptible affordances (Gaver, 1991), since
they can offer information about virtual objects that can be acted upon.
A perceptible affordance is a perceptual cue to the function of an object
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that causes an action. For instance, a visual presentation contains visual
information about the behavioural possibilities afforded to the user. It is
this action and behavioural aspect that the affordance concept captures.
In tourism, sightseeing is a common activity. A perceptible affordance
queries what activity a particular sightseer would like to engage in at a
particular moment in time. There are a number of actions that can provide
perceptible affordance in sightseeing when it takes place in a VE. Consider
viewing an attraction on the screen, for instance, a tourist who gazes at an
historic monument and at that moment thinks, “I will walk to the front
door and enter the building through that door”. According to Morie et al.
(2005) all affordances are user contingent; in a VE they are essentially
triggers that might result in an action (physical response) or a reaction
(emotional response) from the participant. Sensory data play a key role.
A video game context can simultaneously enable the perception of
action, when watching images on a screen while sitting passively in a
chair. Another example might be a website for a destination developed
for marketing purposes. In this marketing context we can ask: what is the
effect of this website on the user? An interview may reveal that one user
of the website considers the portrayed destination to be beautiful, while
another person who looks at the same website decides it is time to book
accommodation, find out how to get there, and search for events and
what to do upon arrival. It is this second example that corresponds to
the notion of perceptible affordance. In both cases, the notion of trans-
parency discussed above, of not noticing the technology producing the
experience, is a key part of the affordance-action loop.
But how do we operationalise affordance? Few empirical studies have
operationalised affordance in a VR context. One example from an e-
commerce study is Algharabat and Dennis (2010) who operationalise
virtual affordance as follows: “3D let me feel like as if I am holding a
real laptop and rotating it”. In Chapter 5 we present two experimental
studies which, among other factors, looked closely at the importance of
affordances in a digital tourism context. Additionally, we present new
findings on the view people have of the possibilities and desirability of
digital travel, gathered by survey during the COVID-19 pandemic with
the attendant hazards and restrictions on physical travel.
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Implications For Digital Travel
Telepresence is the experience of being somewhere other than one’s phys-
ical location, and can be achieved through digital media, perhaps only
through digital media. It is tantamount to experiencing a sense of place
through digital technology. The main focus of the chapter was thus to
compare and contrast different current theoretical accounts of telepres-
ence, in the light of their plausibility and implications for understanding
in what ways people can experience a sense of being in a place other than
their physical location, and with other people. These accounts included
presence as a pretence (a simulation of reality), as pretending (making
believe the virtual world is real), as a perceptual illusion (“the illusion
of non-mediation”) and as embodied attention to the surrounding (or
apparently surrounding) environment. These views are all well-accepted in
the field, and all can be seen as contributing to a virtual travel experience,
which is itself a kind of illusion.
Our argument was informed by the Spinozian model of rapid accep-
tance response introduced in Chapter 2—we initially believe (accept as
real) any argument (experience) that we can understand, then may reassess
and reach a more settled judgment once the moment has passed. In line
with this, as we saw in Chapter 2, presence itself is seen as a Type-1, an
intuitive, perceptual process. But digital travel is more than just feeling
present in a mediated environment, in the moment.
Travel is usually planned and is always reflected upon after the event.
During a trip, and while making a visit, our expectations and earlier reflec-
tions will influence the nature of the experience, as will our meetings with
people and the activities we engage in. Afterwards, we will reflect further,
telling ourselves and others about our experiences. What we remember
will be to some extent a function of how present we feel in a place,
whether the place is physical or digitally created—this is a key aspect of
the power of presence and its significance for digital travel.
When we feel highly present, we believe in the perceived world in
which we experience ourselves to be. In that moment it is real to us.
Creating that effect is a key part of a convincing digital travel experience.
To have that experience, we must be attending to the digital world, feeling
as if we are (as-if-physically) surrounded by it. When that is achieved, our
imaginations are involved in at least two ways: in how we perceive our
surroundings, and in how we conceptualise our being there. While we do
not think that we need to make-believe (that the world is real), we do
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use our imagination, and memory, to make sense of what happens there.
The world may be a simulation, be veridical, be misperceived or even be
an hallucination. In the moment we do not reflect on this question, and
so we do not know which it is—but we believe that it is. And when we
later reflect and talk about our experience, it is as if it were real—which,
to us, it was.
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Abstract In this chapter we look at notions of place, as outlined in work
in human geography, tourism studies and other applied social fields. We
consider the distinction between spaces and places and on how different
experiences of place arise in the traveller. This is important to our under-
standing of tourist and other travel experiences, and to experiencing a
sense of place in digital environments. Despite some commonalities, we
find that digital travel is unlike physical travel in many significant respects,
but that the experience of a place can, in some circumstances, be similar.
For digital travel and digital experiences, place attachment is relevant for
places that a person knows well. We conclude that a digital experience can
become a spatial experience if our bodily senses are invoked by the virtual
place.
Keywords Place · Tourism · Human geography · Insideness · Hedonic
consumption
Introduction
Digital technology can be used to create a fantasy world (Book, 2003),
and also to replicate a place that actually exists. If a digital environment
replicates a place a person could physically visit, what experience is created
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and how can we understand it? This is an underlying theme of the book.
In the last chapter, we examined various views and findings on the sense
of being present in another place, other than the place where the physical
body is located. We presented this as a key distinction between physical
travel and digital travel: the location of the traveller’s physical body.
In this chapter we examine different notions of place, as outlined in
work in tourism studies and other applied social fields; how and when
different experiences of place arise for the traveller. We also stress that
virtual travel is unlike physical travel in many significant respects, drawing
on well-established theoretical accounts of travel emphasising the impor-
tance for the overall travel experience of experiencing departure from the
present place (home), the journey itself and the process of arrival (and
“incorporation”) at a distal place.
Several authors have suggested that the ever-expanding move of society
towards electronic communication in some ways destroys the sense of
place underlying many social interactions, social conventions and rituals.
In critically discussing this view, we are influenced by the social geogra-
pher Relph, who reinterpreted the person–environment relationship and
how individuals experience a place phenomenologically. We discuss the
value of how Relph (1976) defines experience of places as “fusions of
human and natural order … [places are] the significant centers of our
immediate experiences of the world”.
A place can be somewhere we leave, and also somewhere we arrive.
Between is the journey, the travel (from the French travail), the work
that takes us from the former to the later. At the place of arrival, the trav-
eller needs to be assimilated into the place, and this is only fully possible
when the necessary cues are “in place”. Insights into the assimilation
process are drawn from the second-home literature, among other sources.
As a step to integrating the contributions from different authors, we
present a framework later in the chapter for evaluating the extent to which
we can describe a digital travel experience as an actual travel experience.
We distinguish between the pre-trip phase, the travel and being there phase
and the post-visit phase. The key question is: to what extent and in what
ways is the digital experience similar to or different from the in situ expe-
rience? In some cases, they are, or are perceived, as different. In other
cases, the answer is that there is weak relationship to the actual in situ
experience, or a strong one—it is a similar experience.
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Sense of Place
Spaces and Places
The term destination is frequently used in the travel literature. Most
often it refers to a geographical place. Space is related term, as in public
or private spaces. What is the difference between a space and a place?
According to Mingers (2001), we experience space in terms of objects
and their relations to each other—next to, on top of, beside—and so on.
To Harrison and Dourish (1996) the relationship between place and space
is essentially a distinction between two accounts of spaces. The first is an
experiential while the second is geometrical (Brewer & Dourish, 2008).
Ciolfi (2004) uses the terms in a similar manner. He defines place as
experienced space, and place is also often used as a geographical term,
indicating what occupies a location.
The social aspect is one of the key components in all human expe-
riences, and for sense of place. Meyrowitz (1986) observed that modern
communication media commonly lack the sense of place that would frame
the social behaviours of people meeting physically. People may have what
seem to be face-to-face encounters, and yet they are not, since the partic-
ipants are in different physical places. They do not share an experience of
being in the same place and they behave in ways that would be inappro-
priate if they did—their behaviour is “out of place”. Lentini and Decortis
(2010: 408) write “Sense of place refers to how people apprehend physical
space not only through the perception of its spatial characteristics, but also
through the awareness of the social cues related to it”. The history of a
place, what is it known for, events that have happened there or are going
to happen there, is also part of the place construct.
Human Geography and Edwards Relph’s Place Theory
In his inaugural editorial of Tourism Geographies, Alan Lew (1999)
pointed out that the field of tourism research is characterised by an over-
representation of studies that bear a geographic orientation. This is not
surprising since the concept of place is one of the core constructs in
human geography (Kaltenborn, 1998). Tourists visit places. Therefore,
it is reasonable that destinations and attractions represent core subjects in
the tourism research terminology (Tribe & Xiao, 2011).
Geographers commonly use the term sense of place. It is a relational
concept (Sack, 1992) that must be understood within the context of
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human—environment relationships. Kaltenborn (1998) argues that the
meaning of place is not inherent in the properties of nature, but rather
interpreted and constructed by humans in particular contexts and situa-
tions. For Cheng et al. (2003) place emerges in the intersection of three
spheres: social and political processes, the physical, and social and cultural
meanings.
In most cases, geographers study residents and not visitors, but sense of
place is also relevant in the context of tourism. In tourism, there is stream
of research on visits to outdoor environments such as national parks
(Kyle & Chick, 2007; Williams et al., 1992; Williams & Vaske, 2003).
One of the central concepts used by Williams, Kyle and others is place
attachment; that is, a bond that a person might have to a particular place.
Researchers in human geography use the concept of place attachment
to explain why people visit the same recreational park again and again.
Also, researchers on the topic of second homes (e.g. Jaakson, 1986) use
place attachment to understand the place experience (Gustafson, 2001;
Stedman, 2006; Williams & Kaltenborn, 1999). For digital travel and
digital experiences, place attachment can be a relevant concept for places
that a person knows well.
The term tourism experience is frequently used, but is not a term
commonly used by geographers who, according to Li (2000), prefer
the term “geographical consciousness” to relate to the human experience
of space, place and the aesthetic elements of a place. Li (2000) argues
that the concept of geographical consciousness has been overlooked by
tourism research although it is closely related to the tourism experience.
Li adds that insights from geographers, particularly Edward Relph and
Yi-Fu Tuan, are relevant for the field of tourism because “tourism expe-
rience is intimately joined with a tourist’s cognition such as geographical
consciousness” (Li, 2000: 877).
Relph is the author of the frequently cited monograph Place and
Placelessness (1976). According to Seamon (1982), Relph reinterpretes
phenomenologically the person–environment relationship and how indi-
viduals experience a place. Relph defines experience of places as “fusions
of human and natural order … [places are] the significant centers of our
immediate experiences of the world” (p. 141). His insideness–outsideness
concept reflects the nature of one’s involvement with a place. It is reason-
able to argue that for a place experience the insideness types of experience
are more relevant and fit better for residents than visitors while the outsi-
deness types are more relevant for and have a better fit with visitors than
4 VISITING PLACES 77
residents. Relph’s seven types of place experience are presented in Table
4.1.
Building on Relph’s work, the sociologist Gustafson (2001) proposed
a three-pole triangular model with the components self, environment
and others. Turner and Turner (2006) applied Gustafson’s model in a
VR context. They argued that when studying virtual applications, and in
particular those that mirror the physical world, Gustafson’s model and
Relph’s theory both seem appropriate. Gustafson, however, emphasises
people, the life of the people living in a place, and to a lesser extent the
physical environment. A place is a phenomenon by which their behaviour
can be described, explained and predicted (Snepenger et al., 2007).
The philosopher Edward Casey (2001) distinguished between dwelling
as residing and dwelling as wandering, and also emphasised bodily
engagement. Casey defines place in consonance with Merleau-Ponty’s
term “lived body”. To Merleau-Ponty the lived body consists in an I can,
a practical engagement in the world. According to Casey (2001: 718)
Table 4.1 Relph’s seven types of place experience
Existential insideness:
Feeling of attachment and being at home, 
experience of place as full of meanings
without self-conscious reflection
Behavioral insideness:
The place is perceived as objects and 
activities. Awareness of the distinctiveness 
of the place and engagement with the place
Empathetic insideness:
A concern for and interest in the place, but 
not necessarily directly involved with or 
agreeing to the meaning of the place (to others)
Existential outsideness:
Sense of not belonging, feeling of 
separation, alienation, lack of meanings 
and (reflective) un-involvement
Objective outsideness:
Place is a thing to be studied and manipulated
A dispassionate attitude, a separation and
distance between person and place
Incidental outsideness:
Place is experienced as incidental 
background for activities, what the person
is doing overshadows where the person is
Edward Relph’s Place Theory
Vicarious insideness:
Experience of place in a secondhand or 
vicarious way without physically visiting the 
place, the person is involved with the place, a 
transportation through imagination
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“only the body holds together, in one coherent entity, the sense of place, the
past pertinent to that place (that is, via body memories), and the orienting
power which place requires. The body is the only aspect of our being - indi-
vidual or collective - capable of performing place, that is to say, making
place a living reality”. Seamon (2018: 14) comments that Merleau-Ponty
says little about the significance of place directly, but: “his perspective does
much to clarify its integral relationship with the lived body and human
situatedness”.
For digital travel and digital experiences, a focus on the body might at
first been seen as irrelevant. We suggested in Chapter 3 that what distin-
guishes digital travel is that the traveller’s body can be seen as being left
behind. But this is only half the story. In our discussion of Merleau-Ponty,
and research that build his theoretical contributions, we saw the impor-
tance of evoking bodily reactions. A digital experience can be a spatial
experience and our bodily senses are then invoked by the virtual place. In
digital travel, the body is located in one physical place, but at least some
embodied sensory experiences are invoked somewhere else—in a digital
place.
Marketing and Hedonic Consumption
Tourists are, or most often can be seen as, consumers. Consumers may
process information from either a hedonic or a utilitarian perspective
depending on their goals (Pham, 1998; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). In
the marketing literature, the two articles by Holbrook and Hirschman
(1982) and Hirschman and Holbrook (1982) on hedonic consump-
tion are seminal. According to Hirschman and Holbrook (1986: 219),
consumption experience is “an emergent property that results from a
complex system of mutually overlapping interrelationships in constant recip-
rocal interaction with personal, environmental, and situational inputs”. It
is the synthesis of the affective and cognitive actions and reactions that
consumers have during their interface with products, services and the
environment of the marketplace.
The articles by Holbrook and Hirschman have had an influence on
the field of tourism marketing because the tourism experience empha-
sises experiential aspects of visiting places. For some travellers, hedonic
might describe quite well what they do and seek on their vacation.
For others, utilitarian aspects might be more important. Some visitors
also develop an affective connection with specific places or destinations
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(Giuliani & Feldman, 1993; Hidalgo & Hernandez, 2001). The experien-
tial qualities of a tourist destination’s offerings are something that tourism
marketers recognise as significant for travellers. Shopping is a common
tourist activity, and therefore hedonic and utilitarian consumption have
been used to capture and analyse shopping as a tourism activity (Jones
et al., 2006).
Some researchers conceive and conceptualise a tourist destination
as an amalgam of components that form a holistic experience of the
place visited (Murphy et al., 2000). Tourism is often referred to as a
hedonic consumption experience (Govers & Go, 2005; Govers et al.,
2007; Vogt & Fesenmaier, 1998). Snepenger et al. (2004) investigated
the meanings associated with a spectrum of tourism places. They found
that tourism places could be differentiated in terms of their normative,
hedonic, utilitarian, social and consumption meanings. Snepenger et al.,
(2004: 115) posit that places serve distinct functions in people’s lives and
“the greater the tourism demand for a place, the more hedonic the normative
meanings of experiences at the place”.
Investigations of the hedonic and utilitarian components of consump-
tion have been addressed in various disciplines including advertising. In
advertising research, it is not uncommon to use virtual environments or
virtual applications (Ping et al., 2010; Goh et al., 2014). Some researchers
in this field use the term “advergames”. According to Dahl et al. (2009),
an advergame tries to offer consumers an interactive entertainment so
that the player may form an emotional connection between the game
and the brand featured within it. In a recent paper by Speilmann et al.
(2018), respondents (in several studies) were instructed to think about
the last memorable experience they had when traveling to a destination.
Based on the empirical results and analysis, the authors proposed a place
authenticity scale. A key element in a memorable experience concept is
realness, which concerns the availability of believable facts and accuracy
in rendition. These factors play a similar role in a digital experience as in
an in situ experience.
There are many interesting findings from advergame studies, and one
conclusion is that it makes sense to use games and 3D environments for
product placement, advertising research and shopper studies (Jiang &
Benbasat, 2004; Lau et al., 2014). While some of the researchers give
explicit tasks to the participants in the advergame, for instance, to do
shopping, others do not give any tasks besides using the game application.
When designing a study for virtual environments as tourist locations, it is
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relevant to build on these advergames studies because they typically focus
on behavioural intention and experiential aspects.
Intention to Visit a Place and Word of Mouth
In an e-commerce context, purchase intentions have been used in several
studies (Ahn & Bailenson, 2011; Chen et al., 2019; Griffith & Chen,
2004; Jiang & Benbasat, 2007; Kim & Shim, 2002; Li et al., 2002,
2003; Suh & Chang, 2006) to gauge later behaviour. The equivalent in a
tourism context is the intention to visit a place or destination. The vivid-
ness of information can sometimes but not always increase its persuasive
power (Taylor & Thompson, 1982) and a direct experience can influence
persuasion (Fazio & Zanna, 1978; Wu & Shaffer, 1987), and therefore
intention to purchase and, presumably, intention to visit a place.
In consumer research, word of mouth (WoM) is a well-established
concept (Arndt, 1967; Richins, 1983) to help predict purchase inten-
tions. Word of mouth is defined by Anderson (1998) and Singh (1988)
as all informal communications between a customer and others regarding
evaluations of goods or services. The WoM concept is also used in studies
of service industries (Maxham, 2001; Yu & Dean, 2001) and a number of
other fields (Schmäh et al., 2017). In tourism there seems to be a prefer-
ence for the terms recommendation- and destination-WoM (Bigne et al.,
2001; Simpson & Siguaw, 2008). Both concepts, intention to visit and
word of mouth, are viewed as relevant and useful for empirical studies of
the phenomena in question.
Experiencing Sense of Place
in a Virtual Environment
Smyth et al. (2015) conceptualised the virtual experience of place in a way
that contains the same components as or proposed in Relph’s model of
place. However, in Smyth et al.’s model, physical aspects, affective expe-
riences and activities are all mediated by technology. It is not possible to
reproduce the exact experience of being in a physical place, but Smyth
et al. argue that it is possible to produce a convincing illusion of non-
mediation, a feeling of being there. In Chapter 3 we discussed several
different current interpretations of the factors involved in the creation of
this kind of illusion.
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Traditionally, human geography has not focused on the role of tech-
nology, the experience of a place with or through media, but in telepres-
ence research there is some interest in human geography. Turner et al.
(2005: 10) argue that “Relph’s discussion of ‘insideness’ and ‘outsideness’
offers a compelling insight for contextualizing the VR experience”. They
discuss insideness and outsideness in relationship to Heidegger’s concept
of dwelling. To Heidegger, dwelling is our thought about our relation
to space. Shamai (1991) finds Relph’s distinction between seven different
degrees of outsideness and insideness in ways of sensing a place practical
and useful. Shamai (1991: 349) writes:
Each different way of sensing the place can be seen as a different level on
an ordinal scale; that is, starting with the lowest level of sense of place and
‘climbing’ up six more steps to reach the most intense and deepest way of
sensing a place.
Relph uses the term vicarious insideness (Table 4.1), although very few
tourism researchers use the concept of vicariousness. However, one work
that does include the concept of vicariousness is of particular relevance for
virtual tourism: Vicarious Journeys: Travels in Music (Connell & Gibson,
2004: 7). The authors observe that “many albums from the 1950s and
1960s attempted to ‘capture’ the sounds of far-away places, vicariously
transporting the armchair listener to idyllic holiday destinations, myste-
rious Pacific Islands, Alpine heights or cosmopolitan European streetscapes”.
The term “vicariously transporting” is of interest, and not only for what
music can do, but as suggesting an experience induced by media tech-
nology. Destinations can influence image formation through secondary
place interactions with consumers, so-called vicarious experiences (Kim &
Richardson, 2003).
McCarthy and Wright (2005: 921) in their discussion of technology,
space and the experience of place write:
But people can also have a sense of place as they wander. People can in
some meaningful way dwell in public spaces like arcades and parks as they
move about them, shopping or just hanging out. People can clearly have a
strong sense of place about a city as they wander around its winding streets.
Increasingly, people dwell on street-corners and in the buses, trains or cars
in which they spend hours travelling to and from work. But the experience
of wandering can be considered dwelling only if the people involved feel
settled. In contrast, if people’s wandering is exploratory, if they are trying
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to find a place, get oriented, or simply moving between places, there is no
dwelling or being in place.
Although not many in telepresence research have built on human geog-
raphy, it is reasonable to reflect on and apply concepts from this field in
studies of the feeling of being there and ask: just how is the body part
of a telepresence experience? Raymond et al. (2017) refer to Evans and
Stanovich’s dual process theory in their discussion on affordance in sense
of place research. Raymond et al. (2017: 5) write: “it remains unclear
how the immediately perceived and sensory dimensions of sight, smell,
hearing, taste, and touch (i.e. aspects of sensory experience) contribute to
overall place meaning (2017: 5)”. A recent study by Buzova et al. (2020)
focused on sensory perceptions of how tourists evaluate their place expe-
riences, based on a lexical analysis of blogs, and seeks to unpack the role
of the senses in visitors’ destination evaluations. As we saw in Chapter 3,
the experience of presence is best understood as an example of Type-
1 processing: as immediate, instinctive and un-reflective. When we are
preoccupied with trying to work out where we are, and how to find our
way somewhere else, we engage in primarily Type-2 processing—more
logical and reflective. Our attention is channelled in such a way that we
are not so aware of actually being there, of dwelling, in the current place.
Insights from Non-digital Travel and Tourism
In Chapters 2 and 3 we discussed aspects of feeling one is somewhere and
the digital experience of being there in another place. But the telepresence
experience cannot be understood without a reference to the travel and
tourism experiences to places in situ. In this section, we look more closely
at the travel and tourism perspective, of being there in situ. Below we draw
attention to the work of the sociologist Eric Cohen (1972, 1979) and to
tourism as an activity that is intrinsically motivated and can be studied
from the individual traveller’s point of view (Mannell & Iso-Ahola, 1987;
Pearce, 1991).
Cohen (1979) identified five modes of tourism experience: recre-
ational, diversionary, experiential mode and existential modes. The first
two, the recreational mode and the diversionary mode, are particularly
relevant to our discussion. The recreational mode emphasises that the
individual tourist steps outside the normal, the ordinary, in search of
entertainment. It is well known that many tourists take part in activities
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that can be characterised as entertainment, such as visiting scenic places,
visiting famous restaurants, and engaging in situational leisure activities.
The second is the diversionary mode. The motivation here is to break out
of the daily routines and stress of everyday life for a short while, by going
to another place and not having the same routines and obligations.
As a step to integrating Cohen’s contributions and those of other key
authors in the field, we present (Table 4.2) a framework for evaluating
the extent to which we can describe a digital travel experience as an actual
travel experience. We distinguish between the pre-trip phase, the travel,
the being there phase and the post-visit phase.
Tjostheim developed and tested an extended version of Edward
Relph’s types of placeness that included behavioural outsideness and vicar-
ious outsideness (Tjostheim, 2020; see Table 4.3). As with Cohen’s
distinction between recreational or diversionary tourism experience, the
three categories of outsideness—incidental, behavioural and vicarious
outsideness—can serve as a counterpart, a yardstick to make sense of the
telepresence experience. In Chapter 5 we report results from the use of a
measure that included these additional types, to shed more light on the
role of sense of place in digital travel experiences.
Conclusions
In this chapter we have examined notions of place, as outlined in work
in tourism studies and other applied social fields and on how and
when different experiences of place arise in the traveller. The distinction
between spaces and places, and experiencing a sense of place, are impor-
tant to our understanding of tourist and other travel experiences. These
insights can be generalised to experiencing a sense of place in digital envi-
ronments. Marketing and the notion of hedonic consumption are also
useful in understanding travel and travellers, for example, through their
intention to visit a place and provide word of mouth recommendations
about it.
The tourist experience is an amalgam of different experiences. It
involves all senses and therefore their impact should not be overlooked in
efforts to theorise tourism’s experiential dimensions (Dann & Jacobsen,
2002, 2003; Edensor, 2006; Franklin & Crang, 2001; Rickly-Boyd,
2009: 269, Ryan, 2010).
A key question concerns the extent and ways in which a digital expe-
rience similar to or different from the in situ experience. Virtual travel is
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Table 4.2 Framework for evaluating the extent to which a digital travel expe-
rience can be seen as an actual travel experience (bold indicates the most
relevant)
In situ Digital
The pre-trip phase, the
anticipation of the travel
experience








































Weak or similar to
Weak or similar to
Weak or similar to
No
No
Weak or similar to
Weak or similar to
















Weak or similar to
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Weak or similar to Weak or similar to Weak
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Table 4.3 Relph’s types of sense of place with two new types of outsideness
unlike physical travel in many significant respects, but the experience of
a place—once one has the feeling of being there—may be more or less
similar. For digital travel and digital experiences, place attachment can be
a relevant concept for places that a person knows well. And a digital expe-
rience can become a spatial experience if our bodily senses are invoked in
the virtual place. A key element in a memorable experience is perceived
realness. Facts and accuracy play a similar role in digital experiences as in
in situ experiences, as we shall see in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
The Reality of Digital Travel
Abstract It is the experience that counts, there and then. When a person
talks about the experience, he or she can also reflect on and interpret
the experience. In this chapter we use findings from empirical studies and
surveys to write about the subjective reality of digital travel. We discussed
the theoretical foundation for why we can have the feeling of being there
(and what we referred to as the Spinozan model of perception) in Chap-
ters 2 and 3. The first studies we report are on factors affecting the
sense of place experience, and telepresence, using video games to create
a sightseeing environment for participants. The second study is a survey
of citizens on the topic of vacation planning, digital travel applications
before, during and after visiting a tourist destination.
Keywords Surveys · Digital sightseeing · Travel apps · Sense of place
Introduction
In this chapter, we look at the factors affecting digital travel. We present
cases and review experimental results from studies comparing various
rated aspects of the telepresence experience and the sense of place in real-
istic virtual settings. We look at situations in which the place experience is
evoked by new technologies, and present results suggesting that there are
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valid reasons for building on previous telepresence research, and using
some existing scales or measurements from the telepresence field. We
then outline how concepts from human geography and marketing, such
as word-of-mouth recommendation, intention to visit and perceptible
affordance, can also be important.
We identify which of the various components that can contribute to
telepresence are most important, for example, perceptual realism and its
relation to sensory experiences in virtual environments, relating this back
to our earlier discussions of the psychological and philosophical under-
pinnings of the sense of presence in Chapter 3. We examine how this
relates to sense of place, using our own expanded version of Relph’s
multi-component model of the elements of sense of place we described
in Chapter 4. We also look at the dimension of hedonistic consumption,
from marketing research, since this can be seen as an important factor in
the motivation to undertake virtual travel and meetings.
Concerning the current status of digital travel, we share findings from
a recent survey of vacation planning among people from Norway, in the
summer of 2021. The backdrop is the pandemic situation with restric-
tions on travel. Although Norway is one of the least effected countries
in terms of numbers infected, patients in hospitals and deaths due to
the COVID-19 virus, the national health authorities and the govern-
ment have recommended citizens not to travel abroad or to places in
the country with outbreaks of COVID-19. Due to the progress of vacci-
nation, with 50% of the population 16 years of older with at least one
vaccination-dose at the time of writing, many of the restrictions, for
instance, 10 days in quarantine hotel after a travel abroad, have been taken
away for the fully vaccinated. For those with one dose, it is currently only
a 3-day stay at home quarantine after travel abroad, unless a test at the
border shows that a traveller has the virus. Moreover, since most coun-
tries in Europe have open borders for travellers with a negative virus test
or a vaccination certificate, many have started their vacation planning or
have decided to travel. The survey results should be interpreted in this
context.
Because the topic is virtual tourism, digital travel and the future of
travel, it is significant that the citizens have had a year and a half with
few opportunities for travelling abroad. Although most of the restrictions
have been accepted by the population, the longer the pandemic has lasted
more people have felt a need for a normal vacation. For many in Norway,
this means a holiday in Europe, in particular to the Mediterranean region.
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Because of this, the question of digital travel as a substitute for actual
travel is not an unreasonable or purely theoretical question but rather a
timely one in the context of actual travel planning.
The chapter has also a theoretical focus. For empirical research, the
choice of methods and measurements matter. For instance, there are some
limitations that have to do with the participants’ willingness to answer a
survey or to take part in a video game study in person. For researchers,
there are always alternatives that demand methodological choices. Of the
two studies presented in this chapter, the video game study was the more
time-consuming and focused study while the digital travel study has less
depth, but could be carried out in a specific situation just before the main
holiday-season in Norway. For both studies the term “travel experience”
plays a key role. For the survey, the broader perspective, we are influenced
by and build on the works of Erik Cohen for a way to describe travel
motives and modes of tourism experiences.
In tourism research, Cohen is one of the most influential scholars. In
his 1979 paper on the nature of the tourism experience he distinguishes
between five main modes of tourism experience. In Cohen’s paper there
are no references to telepresence or digital travel, but this is not to say that
the five modes cannot be applied in this context. We find the first two,
recreational and diversionary modes, particularly relevant for digital travel.
These two modes concern entertainment, breaking out of daily routines
and stress. They can also be used to describe to the extent to which
an experience in a digital environment is a recreational or diversionary
tourism experience.
Finally, there are opportunities created by technology. Due to the
pandemic, digital meetings are not extraordinary, but rather common
in work life and more generally. Similarly, visits to museum, broad-
casted digital concerts and cultural events are actual alternatives for many
to visiting in person. The pandemic had an immediate effect on the
travel and hospitality industry, events, cultural institutions and the service
sectors related to these industries. Due to the many restrictions, and the
fact that it has not been possible to predict when the pandemic will be
over, companies in these industries have looked for alternatives. Examples
are the news story by skift.com, 1 April 2020 “Tour Guides and Attrac-
tions Operators Shift to Testing Experiences – Online”, 9 March 2021
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“Heritage Sites Copy Tricks from Video Games to Woo Visitors1” and
the company Eventbrite’ future outlook, 26 March 2021:
When we looked at the year-over-year data comparing March 2020 to
March 2021, virtual tour and virtual travel events increased a staggering
41X. Although this growth will likely taper off as we start safely gathering
in-person again, virtual travel and virtual tours have enabled people around
the globe to experience new places from the comfort of their couches, and
have given people access to places they perhaps could never travel to in
person, and that’s a trend we hope continues post-pandemic.
The digital travel survey that we present in the second section of this
chapter contains information on the current situation in the use of digital
travel apps and virtual presentations.
Digital Travel and Sense of Place
In this section we present findings from an empirical study of a digital visit
to Los Angeles in a video game. But first we ask: what is the relationship
of a visit to a place in VE and an experience in vivo? The prerequisite for
this question is that the VE used in the video game study is a replication of
an actual place, the city of Los Angeles. Secondly, and particularly relevant
for tourists on vacation, what is it that the person (traveller, tourist) would
like to do in a virtual environment?
In Chapter 2 we presented Gibson’s affordance concept. Affordances
are about action, intention to behave or actual behaviour. It is a useful
concept theoretically as well as practically (method-wise). Few studies
have compared the virtual actions with actual behaviour in the mate-
rial world (Burke et al., 1992; Clemenson et al., 2020; Khenak et al.,
2020; Mania & Chalmers, 2001; Nisenfeld 2003; Tjostheim & Haug-
land, 2005; Tjostheim & Saether-Larsen, 2005; Usoh et al., 2000). The
results from these studies indicate that there are correlations and many
similarities between the two. However, it is not an easy task to design
an empirical study to investigate this relationship (Howlett et al., 2005).
In the Howlett study the respective times taken to complete tasks in the
1 Questo has invented games for tourists to play in more than 80 cities via its mobile
app. Players can pretend to explore cities in the guise of major figures, such as travelling
around Zurich as Einstein, and listen to stories about local history in exchange for earning
points in a game (Skift.com, October 19, 2020).
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real and virtual worlds were compared in order to establish how well the
virtual experience mimicked the real-world scenario.
To study digital travel and sense of place we chose a city well known
to many tourists, Los Angeles. Sightseeing is a popular activity, particu-
larly for tourists (Adler, 1989; Dunn-Ross & Iso-Ahola, 1991). It is not
something all travellers do, but it is rarely necessary to explain what it
is. Sightseeing is meaningful in a virtual environment of a city as well
as when actually visiting the city in vivo. This was a prerequisite for
the study. Some researchers use the term ecological validity when they
discuss this question—the goal is that the findings are representative,
meaningful outside the study-context. Also, city tourism is particularly
common among young travellers, which is relevant because we recruited
students as our study participants.
The Use of Video Games and Photo-Realism
It is not difficult to find virtual environments of cities because in a number
of video games the setting for the story is an urban environment or a place
with which the player is quite likely to be familiar. The Xbox game Project
Gotham Racing 4 (PGR4) can serve as illustration. In this game the player
drives a car in the streets of London, Macau, Las Vegas, St Petersburg,
Tokyo, New York City, Shanghai and Quebec. There is a second reason
for mentioning this game; in PGR4 there is also an alternative to the
racing option, called “tourist mode”, in which the player can explore the
cities in the game without competing. There are other examples, such as
the Playstation game Gangs of London that also features a tourist mode.
In the tourist mode the player can explore and take photographs of the
city’s most famous landmarks. The most recent game by Xbox at the time
of writing, Forza Horizon 5, launched in November 2021, features places
in Mexico including the city of Guanajuato.
Widyarto and Latiff (2007) argue that a virtual application works well
in a travel context as a tool for getting to know the place, for instance,
for navigation purposes. Schwartz (2006), in his study of video games,
discusses the fact that many games combine fantasy with a sense of
realism. He uses the game Grand Theft Auto as an example and cites
a player who says: “you feel as if you’re in a real town/city with other
people” (Schwartz, 2006: 315). According to Schwartz (2006), realism
and attention to detail allow gamers to accept the game spaces as real,
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and therefore some gamers choose to visit the game space, that is, they
explore the game space as a tourist would explore a physical location.
There are several genres of video game, one of which is termed “life
simulations” (Jong et al., 2013). For life simulations, the goal is not to
mimic social interaction as accurately as possible, but often, social interac-
tion plays a role. There is also a trend referred to as “realism” (Dormans,
2011), which might explain why the graphics in many games are often
based on photography. There is a second aspect to realism in games. As
Sommerseth (2007: 767) argues that: “realism is dependent on actions
rendering expected results in a game. The question of realism is tied to
the experience of the player, rather than the constructed environment of the
game”.
A study by Gackenbach and Bown (2011) concerned video games
in different genres: action, adventure, driving, miscellaneous, roleplaying
and sports. They used the Temple Presence Inventory (Lombard et al.,
2009) to measure perceptual richness. One of the conclusions was that
perceptual richness, “which is about how the game is like the real world”,
has a positive impact particularly for sport, but also for action games. In
a fantasy world, it is not important to replicate a city or another place
that can be visited. However, in a tourism context and with sightseeing
in a city as the activity, realism is obviously important. The VE of the city
should be, and be perceived as, similar to the actual city. Then it makes
sense to study tourist behaviour in the VE.
We used the video game Midnight Club LA, a Playstation game, to
study sense of place. The choice of the video game with the city Los
Angeles was primarily based on the following two factors; (1) realism and
(2) the fact that many users know how to navigate in a game environ-
ment. Not all citizens are experienced video gamers, but most people
know the basics, how games work. Often with IT applications there is a
learning phase before the user can concentrate on doing what he or she is
supposed to do. To move forward in the game environment, to stop, etc.
To race fast might require some skills, but the younger generation often
have these skills already. For the sightseeing in the Los Angeles study,
only very basic video game skills were needed. The level of realism is high
in the game, mostly because of the attention to detail and good graphics
made by the developers of the game.
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The game Driver: San Francisco by Ubisoft has many similarities to
Midnight club LA. This is a review of this game by Joe Barron2:
Driver: San Francisco is, as you might have already guessed, set in the real-
world San Francisco, as well as small parts of Marin County and Oakland.
All in all, there will be a staggering 208 miles of road, all of which is
looking remarkably detailed in what has been shown of the game so far.
The graphical detail and the rock solid 60 frames per second are very
impressive for a game of this scale. The environments look superb, if a
little stylized, and the city’s landmarks are instantly recognizable. Roads
are populated with far more traffic than we are used to seeing in other
open-world games and all of the cars are very well modelled with detailed
textures which would not look out of place in closed-circuit racing games
like Forza Motorsport and Shift. All of this detail combined with such a
superb frame-rate should make this version of San Francisco one of the
most accurate and enjoyable yet seen in games.
The trend towards convergences between gaming and cinema, and
gaming and online technologies, started at least 15 years ago (Freitas &
Griffiths, 2008). The key aspect is realism. One technique to achieve
realism is to merge computer-generated graphics with real-life images.
For a normal viewer it is sometimes impossible to distinguish between a
photorealistic computer image and a photographic image (Lyu & Farid,
2005; Maejima et al., 2010). An example from the film-industry is the
science-fiction thriller “Alita: Battle Angel” by Robert Rodriguez and
James Cameron, released in January 2019. In many scenes in this movie
CGI animation is combined with live action. For most viewers it is hard
to distinguish between graphics and film in the action scenes.
Creating a Sightseeing Experience in a Video Game
Photo-realism matters, but it is not only the visual aspects that plays a role
in a sense of place experience. In the Los Angeles study, the activity given
to the participants was sightseeing in a famous area in the city. Often
there is a guide telling the tourist, the sightseer, what he or she is looking
at, and stories about the place. There are many good reasons for this,
one being that people think narratively (Weick, 1995; Woodside et al.,
2 http://www.hookedgamers.com/pc/driver_san_francisco/preview/article-890.html.
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2007). There is an entertainment element to it also—good stories are
persuasive (McKee, 2003; Woodside & Megehee, 2010). Turner et al.
(2005) comment that the users of a virtual environment need a mean-
ingful narrative in order to create an engaging experience and a sense
of place. A sightseeing experience in a VE is more than a visual experi-
ence. Narratives are, for example, stories that a user can inhabit from a
first-person perspective. The narrative creates meaning for the individual’s
experience in a virtual environment. The narrative plot can be an impor-
tant contributor to the sense of being there (Gorini et al., 2011; Turner
et al., 2013).
Some tourists go sightseeing on their own without a guide present.
There is also the possibility of using an audio guide that can be played on
a mobile device, for instance, a mobile phone. We chose this alternative.
For the city Los Angeles, we chose audio guides that the traveller can use
while visiting the area that includes Hollywood Boulevard. The narrative
for the sightseeing tour was made from a Tourcaster audio guide, a guide
that can be downloaded on a mobile phone or another device. In vivo a
tourist will turn the audio guide on and off himself, and listen when it
suits him. For this study, we had to produce a narrative that was the same
for all participants.
The sightseeing was a live event in the sense that the visuals of the game
were used without any adaptation. In order to create a better sightseeing
experience, the music that comes as a component of the game was turned
off and replaced by an audio clip taken from the Tourcaster “Hollywood
Audio Tour”. The audio came from a laptop computer placed in front
of the participant, the sightseer. No information was given regarding the
name of the Playstation game. In the next section we give more details
about the design of the study.
A Virtual Visit to Los Angeles
The game Midnight Club LA features some of the well-known sections
of the city Los Angeles. With the game and an audio guide, we designed
a sightseeing tour in the city, in Hollywood Boulevard and the historic
district, a live event that lasted approximately 15 minutes. The guide told
stories about the buildings, events, movies and what the person could see
when he or she is actually there in the streets.
In the game, the player can drive on the road or on the pavement, but
not through buildings. Similarly, the tourist, the participant in the study
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could freely navigate in Los Angeles in the game. Because we framed the
event as a sightseeing tour, the participant had to follow instructions from
the guide (recorded in advance) and also instructions by the interviewer
as a co-guide. The participant, the sightseer was only given instructions if
she moved too fast or too slowly. The setting was an auditorium with a
big screen—the Playstation console was connected to a monitor.
A total of 60 individuals, primarily students participated in the LA
study, from a number of countries. Of the 60 participants, 60% were
female and 40% were male, 48% were between 19 and 24 years of age,
and 75% answered that they used video or computer games approximately
once a month or less frequently. The nationalities of the 19 summer
school students were; Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, China, Croatia, Ethiopia,
Greece, Kosovo, Lithuania, Nepal, Pakistan, Portugal, Tanzania, Ukraine,
USA and Zimbabwe. The other 41 students came from Norway.
The Sightseers’ Experience of Telepresence and Sense of Place
To measure the telepresence experience, it is common to use ques-
tions that distinguish between aspects that constitute telepresence. The
measurement, the Temple Presence Inventory (TPI) by Lombard et al.
(2000, 2009, 2011) has these factors: engagement (mental immersion),
spatial presence, social realism, social presence and perceptual realness.
For the Los Angeles study, the participants answered questions for each
for these factors on a seven-point Likert scale from fully disagree to fully
agree.
Relph’s place theory (Relph, 1976) has been used for numerous studies
of sense of place, or experience of place (e.g. Benyon et al., 2006;
Seamon, 1982, 1996, 2000, 2018; Shamai, 1991; Smith, 2006; Smyth
et al., 2015; Turner & Turner, 2006; Turner et al., 2005). Traditionally,
human geography has not been concerned with virtual reality, and the role
of technology. Researchers in this field have primarily focused on humans
living in a place, on secondary homeowners, and less frequently on visi-
tors to the place. Edward Relph has a phenomenological perspective in
his work. He discusses everyday experiences and the relationship between
the human and the place. In the introduction to his paper “Spirit of Place
and Sense of Place in Virtual Realities” (2007) Edward Relph comments
on place and VR:
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I have written about the concept “place” from a phenomenological
perspective for many years…, but we have limited knowledge of digital
virtual reality… Nevertheless, it seems to me that mutual interaction is at
work between what might be called “real” place and virtual places.” His
view reflects the notion that virtual places cannot be authentic, but “virtual
places can be more or less accurate reproductions (our emphasis) of real
places and more or less convincing on their own terms. (Relph, 2007: 23)
In Chapter 4 (Table 4.1) we presented the two main categories; insid-
eness sense of place and outsideness sense of place with four and three
types, seven in total. Relph distinguishes between these seven types of
place experience, but they are not all possible variants for tourists. In
comparison with residents, tourists visit a place for a short time. Hence,
the outsideness categories seem to be the most appropriate for tourism
and a sightseeing experience.
We could not find any that had developed a measurement based on
Relph’s experience of place theory. We therefore decided to develop a
measurement that included behavioural outsideness and vicarious outside-
ness (unpublished thesis, Tjostheim, 2020), two new types in addition to
the seven by Relph in Place and Placelessness (Relph, 1976), as discussed
in Chapter 4. For the Los Angeles study we used a measurement, a
questionnaire with statements similar in form to the Temple Presence
Inventory. Shamai (1991: 349) writes that: “Each different way of sensing
the place can be seen as a different level on an ordinal scale; that is,
starting with the lowest level of sense of place and ‘climbing’ up six more
steps to reach the most intense and deepest way of sensing a place”. See
Table 4.3, in Chapter 4, for a description of these two additional types
of placeness, behavioural outsideness and vicarious outsideness, and how
they relate to the seven types identified by Relph (1976).
In the survey, the participants also answered questions about how
knowledgeable they considered themselves to be about Los Angeles and
whether they had been to Los Angeles. Knowledge of the destination was
measured with a three-item scale adapted from Smith and Park (1992)
and Suh and Chang (2006). The purpose was to have a scale that could be
used before and after the sightseeing in the VE, to observe the immediate
effect of the experience in the VE.
Los Angeles is a tourist destination. In the survey, we included a
question about intention to visit the city the next three years. Is this inten-
tion related to actual behaviour? In consumer studies purchase intention
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is often used as a measure of anticipated response behaviour (Bearden
et al., 1984). According to Tian-Cole and Cromption (2003), a person’s
intention to visit a destination is a determinant of their actual behaviour
of visiting that destination or not. Hence a question about behavioural
intentions can be used as a surrogate for a destination choice.
Results---Virtual Sightseers Had
the Feeling of Being There in the City
Our main interest was to investigate whether or not the digital sightseer
had the feeling of being there, and what type of sense of place experience
the sightseer had. Figure 5.1 shows the scores measured on a scale of 1–7.
Figure 5.1 shows on average a score on the positive side of the scale for
all three concepts, telepresence, sense of place and the hedonic consump-
tion experience. When there are significant differences in the variances
in the answers, as in this case, the average score does not give the best
information. We therefore show three groups (Fig. 5.2). The first is those
that answered 1–3, referred to as the negative group for telepresence,
those that did not have the feeling of being there. The second group is
Fig. 5.1 How the participants experienced Los Angeles measured with three
alternative measurements
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Fig. 5.2 Los Angeles—the feeling of being there
the neither-nor group, those that answered 4. The third group consists
of those that did experience the feeling of being there, and similarly for
sense of place and hedonic consumption experience.
The main finding was that 2 out of 3 participants reported a feeling of
being there, a sense of place experience and/or a hedonic consumption
experience (Fig. 5.2). The participants were asked to report how they felt,
and the interviews took place immediately after the digital sightseeing.
The questions in the Temple Presence Inventory about perceptual
realism were used to create three groups. The “senses evoked group”
were 18 of the 60 participants in the study. This was the 18 that reported
that several of their senses were evoked. We looked at the score on the
affordances question. Figure 5.3 shows the correlation with, or the effect
of perceptual realism on the affordances.
The sightseeing lasted approximately 15 minutes Compared to TV or
online advertisements this is a long time. It is also an interactive expe-
rience and not only a viewing experience. Could we see a direct effect
of the digital sightseeing experience on the participants? The question-
naire before and the after-the-sightseeing questionnaire had these three
questions:
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Fig. 5.3 Los Angeles—perceptual realism and affordances
(a) “As a tourist destination I feel very knowledgeable about Los
Angeles”
(b) “I feel if I had to book a trip to Los Angeles today, I would need
to gather very little information in order to make a wise decision”
(c) “I feel very confident of my ability to judge the quality of a trip to
this city”
The answers to these questions indicated that the digital experience had
a direct impact on the participants—see Fig. 5.4.
Readers of human geography know the works of Edward Relph, espe-
cially his place theory. How Relph describes sense of place is well known
to researchers in human geography. In tourism, his place theory is known,
but not very often incorporated or used by tourism scholars. Based on
our Los Angeles study, we would argue that it seems quite appropriate to
apply the place theory of Edward Relph to digital experiences as well as
for actual visits by travellers to tourist destinations.
The “hosts” at actual tourist destinations consist of many groups; from
professional service employees in the tourism and hospitality industry to
locals that only occasionally interact directly with visitors. It is not likely
that a city, a town or a small place without any locals will be an attractive
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Fig. 5.4 The effect of the digital experience on the need for travel planning
tourist destination. The quality of the guest–host interaction is an impor-
tant component for travellers. In a digital application, it is not easy to
replicate this human component, the face-to-face interactions. We recog-
nise this aspect, but it was not addressed in the travel survey presented in
the next section.
Digital Travel Applications---A Survey
on Behaviours and Attitudes
The survey was targeted at a cross-section of citizens from Norway. We
invited respondents from panels that recruit from the general population.
The email invitation had the title “A travel survey – about visiting places
digitally”. As a consequence, we can assume that some that were invited,
but with no or little interested in travel, overlooked the email invitation.
Most employees have paid vacations of typically four weeks in the summer
period. However, the restrictions caused by the pandemic have influenced
and made vacation planning more difficult. In particular his is the case for
international travel. This also means that what we refer to as digital travel
might be an alternative for some. In total, 208 answered our survey. Two
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respondents were excluded due to incomplete answers. In this chapter we
report on the answers of 206 respondents.
The survey had the following four sections; the profile of the respon-
dents, travel plans, their view of digital tourist applications before, during
or after a trip and also the role of a privately administered vaccine. Since
international travel is only allow for fully vaccinated or travellers with a
negative COVID-19 test, there has been a demand for taking a vaccine
outside of the national health provision.
We present the survey findings for the age groups 16–29 years old, 30–
49 years old, the 50–70 years old, and for all participants named “All”. As
for the population, the survey had 50% women and 50% men. For level of
education, approximately 25% are in each of the groups—see figure A. As
was expected, it was the 16–29 years old group who had the highest share
of primary education only. In general, the educational profile, the age and
gender distribution of the participants represent the national population
quite well—see Figs. 5.5 and 5.6.
Digital meetings have become normal. There are many platforms for
digital meetings and students and employees are often required to use a
digital platform for meetings. As show in Fig. 5.7 approximately 80% have
Fig. 5.5 The participants—age and gender
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Fig. 5.6 The participants—age and education
Fig. 5.7 Experience with digital meetings
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had experience with digital meetings. It is a high number that reflects the
fact that the pandemic has had a significant impact on the use of digital
meetings.
Not all have the time and resources to have holidays many times a year,
but for some travel has a high priority. Figure 5.8 shows that 2 or 3 times
a year is quite common with 26 and 16% for all. For the youngest age
group 42% answered once a year and only 3% three times or more.
Due to the pandemic, there has been a number of restrictions for travel
in particular for international travel. At the time of the survey, July 2021,
international travel was allowed, but due to a risk of being infected, many
preferred to postpone the vacation. Instead, short distance travel and
travel within the national boarders were much more common. This is
reflected in the answers—approximately 50% had not planned a vacation,
see Fig. 5.9.
Of all the participants only 10% had planned a vacation abroad—see
Fig. 5.10. This is in accordance with findings in similar national surveys
that report that 8–13% have planned a trip abroad.
In most cases fully vaccinated citizens can travel abroad and avoid
quarantine even when the country visited has a high level of infections.
However, the majority of citizens under the age of 45 had not been
Fig. 5.8 Frequency of holiday travel per year
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Fig. 5.9 Travel planning 2021
Fig. 5.10 Holiday destinations
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offered two doses of the vaccine at the time of the survey. For the 16–
29 years old, 44% were waiting for the first dose—see Fig. 5.11. This
is the background for the question about willingness to take a vaccine
privately to make travel easier.
Taken together, for the answers “maybe” and “yes, I would take a
private vaccine”, it is the 30–49 years olds that respond most positively
to this alternative, 13%—see Fig. 5.12. The government and the health
authorities have been warning the citizens against vaccines that are not
offered by the health authorities. Still, for the age groups 30–49 years old,
a total of 25% will take or will consider a private vaccine. This indicates
that travel is important to them. It is not only recommendations by the
government, restrictions and quarantines that matter. One of the reasons
that motivate citizens to take a vaccine is travel.
For travel information, the Internet has for many years played a key role
in planning, booking and communication about travel services. Digital
travel apps and virtual tourism applications can be seen as information
sources in travel context. Figure 5.13 illustrates whether the vacation
planner uses information sources with geographical or place information.
For the question about information sources, we asked about Google
street view or similar applications that have geographical information
Fig. 5.11 The vaccination and age-groups
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Fig. 5.12 Private vaccination and travel
Fig. 5.13 Sources of geographical information and information that can create
a sense of place
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about where hotels, attractions and sights are. This kind of application
can create a sense of place. As shown in Fig. 5.14, quite few have used
virtual travel apps.
The core section of the survey contained questions about digital travel
applications, virtual tourism and presentations or applications that can be
regarded as travel products. We wrote an introduction to explain some
of the terms, that the purpose of some of these travel applications can be
to create a feeling of being there or to be a substitute for the travel. A
digital meeting is not the same as meeting the person face-to-face, but the
digital meeting can have many of the same characteristics. A vacation is
also about getting away from where you live. Therefore, to visit a museum
or attraction digitally is not a substitute for the vacation, but is an example
of a digital travel.
We distinguished between the presentation, what it is like and, in the
following question the experience itself. We asked about museums, hotels,
attractions and guided tours, one at a time. The role of many travel and
tourism companies is to the get people to travel, to get them to book
trips and travel to the destination. Therefore, advertising and marketing
are key factors for these businesses. We used the word “pre-taste” (of
the experience) to indicate that it is more than just the presentation of
Fig. 5.14 The use travel apps or virtual presentations
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information and plain facts—the presentation is intended to let the person
feel what it is like to visit the place. A pre-taste is not a means to an end;
the purpose is to create an interest and or to influence the person to book
a trip. As a digital meeting can sometimes be a substitute for a meeting
in person, a digital travel product can be a substitute for the experience
in situ.
Most museums have online presentations with pictures or videos of
their exhibitions. Some replicate the museum more accurately and create
digital presentations intended to give the user a feeling of being in the
museum. This is the backdrop of the first question about digital museums’
presentations.
For the respondents view on digital presentations of a museum or an
attraction, 58% of the 30–49 years old and 46% of the 50–70 years old
choose “pre-taste of the experience”. For the 16–29 years old, “market-
ing” was the most typical answer with 58% (see Fig. 5.15). Quite few,
only 2%, answered that the experience can be a substitute for the in situ
experience. But for the related question about subjective feeling of the
experience compared to the in situ experience, 22% of the 30–49 years
old, 17% of the 16–29 years old and 13% of the 50–70 years old answered
that it can be similar to the in situ experience (Fig. 5.16).
Fig. 5.15 Digital presentations of museums or other attractions
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Fig. 5.16 Museums and other attractions—the digital experience in comparison
to the in situ experience
For hotels, 48% of the 50–70 years old and 43% of the 30–49 years
old answered “a pre-taste” while 58% of the 16–29 years old answered
“marketing”. An insignificant number, 1%, answered “a substitute” for a
visit to a hotel—see Fig. 5.17. For obvious reasons the need for accom-
modation cannot be substituted digitally, but exploring what the hotel is
like, the building, the location, etc., is relevant. Generally, a substantial
part of the travel budget concerns accommodation and the 50 plus are
normally more willing to pay for a good and central hotel compared to
the younger generations. For activities, it was essentially the same pattern
as for hotels (see Fig. 5.18).
For activities and the question whether or not the digital experience
can be about the same or similar to the actual experience, 9% answered
“similar to” and 21% “about the same”—see Fig. 5.19. The differences
between the age groups were small.
It is quite common to take part in guided tours while visiting a desti-
nation. The next question was about a digital guided tour; is it similar to,
a pre-taste, or a substitute for a physical guided tour.
For this question, there are differences between the age groups with
the highest number for the 50–70 years old. For this age group 55%
of answered “a pre-taste” for a digital version of a guided tour—see
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Fig. 5.17 Digital presentations of a hotel
Fig. 5.18 Digital presentations of activities
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Fig. 5.19 Activities—the digital experience in comparison to the in situ expe-
rience
Fig. 5.20. For the 30–49 years old, 47% answered “a pre-taste” and for
the 16–9 years old 42% answered in the same way.
For the question about whether or not the digital guided tour experi-
ence is about the same or similar to the in situ experience, 27% answered
“about the same” and 18% “similar to” with only minor differences
between the age groups (Fig. 5.21). Of the different types of destinations,
the respondents gave the most positive answers for the digital alternatives
for museums and guided tours. Most travellers take pictures or videos,
with cameras or phones. Quite few, 8% thought that digital travel appli-
cations can be better than the traveller’s own pictures and videos—see
Fig. 5.22.
After the questions about experiences with and opinions about current
digital travel applications, we asked about the role of digital travel appli-
cations in the future. The answers to these questions are not easy to
interpret. To predict what will happen in the future in a longer time frame
is guesswork, but it gives an indication of what kind of expectations for
the future the respondents have.
The expectation is that digital travel applications will play a role in the
planning phase—44% answered with this alternative, but with significant
differences between the age groups, see Fig. 5.23. For “while travelling”,
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Fig. 5.20 Digital presentations of guided tours
Fig. 5.21 Guided tours—the digital experience in comparison to the in situ
experience
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Fig. 5.22 Digital travel applications for sharing and re-experience the vacation
Fig. 5.23 Digital travel applications in the future—expectations
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however, we find low numbers for all three age-groups.
Figure 5.24 shows that 40% indicate a willingness to pay for digital
travel products for historical places, sights and to avoid queues.
Questions about willingness to pay are also hard to interpret. Some
will not reveal what they actually are willing to pay because they believe
that it is better to indicate a low price to avoid high prices. In total,
68% indicated that they are willing to pay 10% of the ticket prices at the
destination—see Fig. 5.25.
The answers to the question about arguments for digital travel was
coded by the authors. 67% did not mention any positive arguments—
see Fig. 5.26. Some 14% wrote that there are good arguments without
mention any. There are some positive arguments, such as that less travel
is good for the environment, and there are barriers due to disabilities,
illness and old age that favour digital travel.
But the majority is not convinced or very interested in a digital alter-
native to actual travel. Figures 5.27 and 5.28 show that there is a small
segment, 10–20%, who believe that they, in the future, will use digital
travel products that create an experience similar to the in situ experience.
We can name this group “digital travellers”.
Fig. 5.24 Willingness to pay for digital travel pro
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Fig. 5.25 Willingness to pay for digital travel products – a comparison to ticket
prices of a service at the travel destination
Fig. 5.26 Arguments for digital travel
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Fig. 5.27 Digital travel—a substitute for the in situ experience
Fig. 5.28 The digital travel experience—similar to the in situ experience?
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Conclusions
As to why we experience the feeling being there, in Chapter 2 we drew
attention to theoretical contributions by James J. Gibson and Maurice
Merleau-Ponty and many others who have discussed perception and the
role of the senses. In the empirical studies we have used the Temple Pres-
ence Inventory, a measurement that includes perceptual realism about the
five senses as one factor. We conclude that the perceptual mediated expe-
rience is actually similar to the unmediated experience. This is not always
the case but, for those experiencing a high level of telepresence, all senses
can be evoked—not only the visual and the audio senses that are directly
stimulated by the technology.
Based on the findings from the empirical studies, and the Los Angeles
study in particular, that not for all but for many of the subjects, the indi-
viduals that “visited the city on the screen”, the digital sightseeing, had the
feeling of being there in the moment. The telepresence experience was
evoked by the VE and it seems that the experience of place was perceived
as real to the user in the intuitive phase when the digital sightseeing took
place. We also found through our survey a group of people that we refer
to as digital travellers.
Looking forward, with the possibilities of advanced technology in
mind, what our survey reveals seems not unlikely. There are many ways
in which digital travel can be developed further, just as there are a range
of different ways in which the current situation of digital meetings can be
improved. We cover this topic—of how to design digital travel and meet-
ings so that they match the psychosocial needs of their participants—in
Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 6
When the Virtual Becomes Real?
Abstract In the first part of this final chapter, we look at several current
trends in technologies used to enable various forms of digital travel, and
some recent innovations—including social telepresence robots, drones,
holograms and immersive VR. We briefly describe the approach and
evaluate the pros and cons and potential of each, then move on to specu-
lations about future directions and new possibilities. We present a method
of stimulating new design ideas for digital travel, based on metaphors and
blending theory. We illustrate the method using the metaphor: “To use
my device is to travel”. In the second part of the chapter, we recap and
finalise our journey through the book.
Keywords Social telepresence robots · Drones · Holograms · Immersive
VR · Metaphor · Blends
Introduction
The restrictions on meetings and travel that have come with the COVID-
19 pandemic have led to enormous change in behaviour and attitudes
about the practicality and acceptability of replacing physical encounters
with virtual ones. Many different kinds of meetings take place without
physical travel; for example, concerts, school and college classes, sports
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events, academic and other conferences, training and personal devel-
opment courses. What do we mean by “take place”? As introduced
in Chapter 1, Meyrowitz (1986) described how modern communica-
tion media commonly lack a sense of place for the communicants. He
suggested that they do not really have face-to-face meetings, since the
participants are in different physical places and do not share an experience
of being in the same place. The meetings do not “take place”. They also
lack the elements of departure, passage and arrival that characterise travel
(Leed, 1991). In this section, we outline the strengths and weaknesses of
using digital technology to meet others without having the sensation of
travel.
Having meetings without physically being in the same place as the
other participants saves time and resources; it is also relatively good for the
environment. However, it is no accident that “Zoom fatigue” has become
a common term for the exhaustion many people feel after spending much
time in digitally mediated meetings (whether on Zoom or some other
technological platform). One reason might be that, since people travel
less currently, they spend more time in meetings overall. But there are
several other possible reasons that reflect the psychosocial reality of digital
meetings.
Bailenson (2021) identified four main reasons for what he calls “non-
verbal overload”. Firstly, with the typical laptop or desktop computer
configuration used for such meetings, people experience too much, very
close, eye contact, often with people we don’t know well. Secondly,
seeing oneself during social interactions is unnatural, and results in self-
consciousness and self-dissatisfaction, which is also fatiguing. Thirdly, we
move less, and bodily movements normally aid our cognition and sense
of comfort. Finally, because of the absence of natural nonverbal cues,
for example, related to eye-contact and head movements, video meet-
ings are more cognitively demanding and therefore tiring. A recent study
by Fauville et al. (2021) found that women generally suffer more Zoom
fatigue than men, partly because they tend to have longer meetings and
shorter breaks, and also because they are more sensitive to seeing their
own video image in this social context.
Face-to-face digital meetings are not really face-to-face, because,
as Meyrowitz (1986) pointed out, the participants are not physically
together. Only the face is seen, the rest of the body is out of view, whereas
in physical meetings our whole bodies participate to provide nonverbal
cues that help people communicate.
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Another issue with digital interaction with distant others is lag—a
delay introduced by the communication network. Even though the time
lag between exchanges is generally less than was the case with old tele-
phonic systems, it still affects interaction. It is well known (e.g. Short
et al., 1976) that a perceptible delay in a person’s responses can give the
impression of hesitancy, perhaps even dishonestly (since we tend to delay
when reflecting before responding, and this might be the time needed to
come up with a less than honest answer). There is a measurable negative
effect on social presence (Cui, et al., 2013). The typical lag on a modern
teleconferencing system is around 0.6s, whereas to be imperceptible the
lag needs to be less than 0.2s (Gunawardena, 1995). Lack of synchro-
nisation between audio and video is also often a problem, with video
“freezes” not being uncommon. Time and synchronisation issues add to
the increase cognitive load of digital meetings, along with low fidelity
or distorted sound and vision. This combination might also be expected
to result in reduced memorability for digital communication, analogous
to the effect found with synthetic speech (Waterworth & Thomas, 1985)
since the increased cognitive load of accurately perceiving content reduces
that available for mental interpretation and storage.
We can see several clear developments in the way people travel and
meet, using digital technology. There are obvious and widespread devel-
opments, such as the expanded use of teleconferencing systems described
above, accessed by computer, tablet and phone. These have been very
successful in allowing a wide range of social activities to continue despite
restrictions on travel. But, as outlined earlier in the book, they do not fully
satisfy the psychosocial needs of their users. They are tiring and stressful
for many. They do not provide a positive travel experience, a sense of
being there, in another place with other people, away from the physical
location of the body. We need to have the sense that we are embodied
in another place, even though we are not. A variety of responses to this
need have emerged already, which we outline in the rest of this section.
Recent Innovations in Digital Travel
In this section, we briefly outline two recent strands in ways of inno-
vating digital travel. The first is represented by social telepresence robots
and drones, the second by immersive VR and the use of holographic
representations.
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Social Telepresence Robots and Drones
The idea behind social telepresence robots is to combine functionalities
common to teleconferencing systems with physical presence in a distant
location via a robot. Their use in this way represents a set of approaches
that stress the need for a proxy physical presence in the distant location,
but downplay the need for a strong sense of psychological presence there.
They have their roots in remote manipulation systems that provide both
views of, and the capacity for surrogate action in, a remote location.
Tsui et al. (2011) describe social telepresence robots as “embodied
video conferencing on wheels”. The typical set up is for there to be a
simple robot that can be controlled by a person in another location.
The robot includes a video camera and a screen, on which the remote
person’s image (captured by the camera of their communication device) is
displayed. Such an arrangement is typically used so that a person at home
can “attend” a meeting in their place of employment, visit a public place
such as a museum or conduct remote inspections at factories or hospitals.
The remote person can move around the place (via the robot), observe
people and things from different viewpoints, visit and speak to different
people—for example, people in different offices or hospital beds—and be
seen and heard by the people there, via the physical presence provided by
the social telepresence robot.
Social telepresence robotics is an expanding field, although not many
evaluative studies have been conducted as yet. In a few cases social robots
have sometimes been given a human, or other animate-creature, form
(Kristoffersson, 2013).
A recent qualitative study of the use of telepresence robots to relieve
social isolation in older adults before and during the Covid-19 pandemic
(Isabet et al., 2021) found that acceptance levels were good, although
they drew no conclusions about whether the robots were more bene-
ficial during the pandemic than before. They do, however, point to a
number of issues that need to be investigated further, including usability
and functionality for social interaction.
Social drones are in some ways a more flexible approach than the use
of robots, since they can in principle go anywhere at any time—whereas
there has be a robot positioned at a remote site for social interaction to
be achieved. Shakeri and Neustaedter (2019) reported on a prototype
system called Teledrone, which combines a drone and controlling inter-
face with what is essentially a teleconferencing system. The envisaged use
6 WHEN THE VIRTUAL BECOMES REAL? 133
case was for distant participant to share in an outdoor activity, such as
hiking, and drones clearly have the advantage of being able to cross and
communicate over difficult terrain and bodies of water. According to the
authors, “Teledrone provides an embodiment for a remote user and can
help support spatial awareness” (from the abstract). In principle, this kind
of approach can be used almost anywhere, even with the drone moving
indoors or into confined spaces, although there may be safety issues when
drones are used in this way.
Immersive VR Approaches and the Use of Holograms
At the time of writing, Oculus (the VR-technology company owned by
Facebook) is using the slogan: “Defy reality and distance”, which could
stand as a general call to take up digital travel. Facebook CEO Mark
Zuckerberg indicated in an article in The Verge (23 July, 2021) that he
sees the future of Facebook as a “metaverse” company. According to the
article, Zuckerberg said: “A lot of the meetings that we have today, you’re
looking at a grid of faces on a screen. That’s not how we process things
either”. Describing how interacting in immersive virtual reality would
change that situation, he is reported as saying: “You feel present with
other people as if you were in other places, having different experiences
that you couldn’t necessarily do on a 2D app or webpage…”.
Full-body immersion has some advantages, in that it is possible to
convey a very rich sense of being in another place, but action in the
remote place is problematic unless the place exists only virtually. It all has
profound social disadvantages. Despite its power for conveying a sense
of being in another place, there are inherent difficulties in using immer-
sive VR from a variety of locations, especially public or social locations
encountered physically in everyday life.
The more one is immersed in a virtual world, the more one is cut
off from the physical world in which the body is located. Just wearing a
head-mounted display can open up a distant place as if one were there—at
least visually and auditorily. But it also renders the wearer vulnerable to
any threats, dangers and social antagonism such as ridicule in the actual
place the physical body is located. Where people are happy to escape
from a dull situation into their phones—waiting for a bus or riding on an
underground train—the same is unlikely to apply when wearing a head-
mounted display. The power and attraction of phones and other mobile
devices is partly that people can devote some attention to both the current
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physical world and the virtual happenings displayed on the device. The
way these two worlds are mixed is far from optimal, both for the user
or the other people involved (both locally and at a distance), but people
manage, for example, to chat with distant others while finding their way
through a train station. This would clearly not be the case with immersive
VR.
Nevertheless, immersive VR of one kind or another is likely to become
increasingly popular as an effective way of experiencing a distant place and
events presented there, from a fixed and secure physical location; in the
privacy of a home office, for example. In a completely virtual world, with
full-body tracking and immersive displays, all kinds of action are possible,
including some not possible with the body in the physical world, such as
flying or passing through walls. Body tracking and immersive displays can
also be combined with technologies such as robots or drones, allowing
digital travel to actual places, though this needs to be carefully regulated
because of obvious safety concerns.
The use of holograms is predicted to be the next big innovation in
teleconferencing. In this set up, two or more locations are linked, as in
a conventional teleconference, but participants in different locations see
each other as holographic representations with a life-size 3D representa-
tion displayed in a specially equipped booth, rather than on a small screen
(see e.g. Wired, 2021). The technology has been available for a decade
or more, but is expected to become both more affordable and in great
demand, largely due to changes in needs and attitudes brought about by
restrictions in physical travel. While holograms might well become a fairly
popular way of improving the vividness and intimacy of digital meetings,
they are restricted to special, generally small, and expensively equipped
rooms (or large booths) at both ends. Clearly, this is not compatible with
flexible digital travel, either in terms of where one can be while travelling,
or where one can travel to.
In contrast to the use of social telepresence robots and drones,
immersive VR and holographic approaches both stress a vivid sense of
psychological presence, but do not afford action in another physical place.
They currently share a dependency on a fixed geographical location when
interacting with distant people and places. This might change with the
rapid pace of technological development, but social acceptance and safety
concerns limit such use.
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Rethinking Digital Travel
To conclude this section, we consider below the ways in which the phys-
ical and the virtual can be blended to support embodied interaction in
integrated places that span distance boundaries, drawing on our theoret-
ical account of the ways in which virtual experiences can be accepted as
real by interactive participants. If experiences in such places can become
real for the participants, virtual travel could in the future replace our
current disjointed social interactions over the Internet.
We have suggested that immersive VR and other technologies are likely
to become increasingly popular as reasonably effective ways of experi-
encing a distant place and events presented there. VR can provide the
most vivid sense of presence in another place, but can only realistically
be used from a fixed, secure private and physical location. Meeting and
visiting at a distance, via mobile devices and laptops, are increasingly
popular, but the experience is less convincing and satisfying as digital
travel. In what ways can we combine digital possibilities with social and
physical realities to overcome some of these shortcomings?
In the rest of this section we consider how we could experience people
and places through digital technology in the future, in light of discussions
and findings from earlier chapters as well as the trends identified above.
Metaphors and the Blending of Physical-Digital Realities
Travel implies a journey, which involves a departure, a passage and an
arrival. In touristic trips, and other types of temporary visit, there is
travel from home to another, distant place, and then a return home
again. Before travel, there is preparation and anticipation; after travel,
recollection and sharing. When applied to digital travel, this is the “home-
away-back-home’’ metaphor (introduced in Chapter 1). The metaphor
provides a starting point for designing more satisfactory ways of imple-
menting digital travel. The most obvious of these is perhaps to mimic
equivalent non-digital settings and interactions as closely as possible with
appropriate technological capabilities and design, but this is both too
ambitious and too limiting. It is too ambitious because far from every-
thing about physical travel can be adequately simulated. It is too limiting
because digital devices can transcend the restrictions of the physical (for
example, with instant travel and instantaneous searches).
136 I. TJOSTHEIM AND J. A. WATERWORTH
However digital travel is realised, technically, it can be seen as a blend
of the digital and the physical. With immersive VR, the blend is almost
entirely digital, but some physical elements remain, since the traveller
moves her body in physical space while experiencing the consequences
within a virtual world. At the other extreme, the blend represented by
standard video conference systems, used on phones or laptops, is heavily
weighted towards the physical—the place where the traveller is actually
located. Digital travel blends also occupy a position on what can be called
the action dimension—the extent to which the traveller can act in the
world they visit. With a social telepresence robot, for example, the trav-
eller can move around in physical space, talk to people and sometimes
make gestures, whereas a visit to a theatrical performance may be very
vivid, but with no possibilities for action in the witnessed performance.
Waterworth and Hoshi (2016) suggest an approach to the design of
interactive presence in what they call “everyday blended reality”. Applying
this approach to designing new ways of realising digital travel would
represent an explicit attempt to blend the reality of physical travel with
that of the interactive possibilities of digital media and devices. There
is no single direction in which digital travel can be expected to evolve,
but we can begin to re-imagine future digital travel possibilities as a set
of different blends of the physical world and selected functionalities of
digital devices. In the rest of this subsection we consider how the design
process might work, and speculate on the possible outcomes.
As described by Imaz and Benyon (2006) “designing with blends”
starts with a metaphor. A common example from HCI research is the
computer desktop metaphor. The user interface appearance, and to some
extent the behaviour from a user’s perspective, is presented as a desktop,
with folders, a trash can, objects that can be moved or opened by the
user and so on. This is the familiar WIMP (Windows, Icons, Menus
and a Pointer) interface common to most PCs. It is said to be a result
of applying the desktop metaphor to the user interface of an operating
system. As in any metaphor, it is somewhat like the thing it conveys (a
physical desktop), but also very different. Imaz and Benyon (2006) point
out that, although this started as being seen as metaphorical, it is no
longer. Rather a “desktop” or “laptop” has become a thing in itself; as
they put it, following Fauconnier and Turner (1998), a new “emergent
space”—a concept in its own right.
Designing with blends works as shown in Fig. 6.1. There is a generic
(conceptual) space that reflects the abstract structure and organisation of
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Fig. 6.1 Designing with blends
an overarching concept, such as in the above “desktop” example, office
work. There are at least two “input” conceptual spaces, which in the same
case might be “computer operations” and “physical office desktop”. Each
of these input spaces inherits some of the characteristics of the generic
space, and also has other characteristics. A few of the characteristics are
shared between the two input spaces; there is “cross-space mapping”; for
example, “storage” and “trashing”. Finally, some of the characteristics of
the input spaces are merged into the blend, a new emergent structure; in
this case this would be a high-level design space for an interface partially
based on the metaphorical idea that a computer is a desktop; the familiar
desktop we all use, and which is now not metaphorical, but a thing in
itself. It is also possible to use two or more emergent blend spaces as
inputs to further blending.
Waterworth and Hoshi (2016) used this approach to design “blended
everyday realities” in which elderly users could interact, with technologies
embedded in their environment, via ambient input objects and display
devices, using simple movements and peripheral perception. In the same
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way, we can imagine the use of blending to create one or more top-
level designs for future digital travel systems, combining some features
of physical travel with selected functionalities of digital communications
technologies. Blended conceptual space is an emergent conceptual struc-
ture that can incorporate new ideas and insights. It can include new
emergent properties that exist neither in the world of physical travel nor
the domain of existing interactive functionalities.
Table 6.1 shows how blending might work when designing some form
of digital travel (one of many possible ways of blending on this topic)
based on the metaphor “To use my device is to be a traveller”. In this
case, input space-1 refers to the frame of ways of utilising current inter-
active technologies (functionalities of devices), input space-2 refers to the
frame of conventional ways of travelling and input space-3 refers to aspects
of embodiment. The generic space that maps onto each of the inputs
contains some of the characteristics they have in common, and reflects
more abstract structure and organisation shared by the inputs, that of
navigating in physical space (making journeys, traversing distance and
social interaction to find the way). The resultant blended space—HCI
is travel (To use my device is to be a traveller)—is the start of a poten-
tially new way of thinking about digital travel. There are many possible
ways of deriving a blended space, depending on the metaphor chosen and
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the features selected from the two input spaces; there are thus very many
possible new designs. It is also possible to blend the blends, by using the
features of two (or more) blended spaces as the input spaces for further
blending.
Several other metaphors seem promising as a basis for designing future
blends. The following is an initial list of candidates:
• When I turn on my computer I become a traveller
• A videoconference is a short visit to another place
• Browsing the Internet is a journey
• My phone is my home
• My PC is a vehicle
• Interaction is an adventure
• I leave home when I use my device, then later I return
• When I visit digital places, I am inside and outside at the same time.
In the next section, we complete our journey through the book,
concluding our argument that the feeling one is actually in a place—
the feeling of “being there”—is vital to the quality and success of virtual
social interactions and travels to distant (or fictional) places. This is espe-
cially relevant at times when travel is restricted or prohibited, since a lack
of travel can mean few social opportunities, leading to a sense of isola-
tion and sometimes depression. Currently, however, virtual travel is unlike
physical travel in many significant respects, and does not adequately satisfy
the socio-psychological needs of people meeting, of tourists and of other
travellers. As we suggested above, new ways of thinking about digital
travel are called for.
Reflecting on Our Journey so Far, and Our Plans
Digital travel is about the sense of being there; being there without having
to go there. We motivated our journey into this territory by noting
that people increasingly travel, visit and meet other people in computer-
mediated environments, and that this trend has been boosted by the
covid-19 pandemic from 2020 onwards. Before that, videoconferencing
and other technologies were already in widespread use by businesses and
as a way for families and friends to keep in touch over distances. Recent
developments have led to many other kinds of meetings and events taking
place without physical travel. This trend seems likely to continue, with
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more and more people meeting and visiting places via digital environ-
ments and interactions. But, as we have suggested, current technologies
for realising these kinds of digital travel do not succeed in matching the
psychosocial needs of participants (Bailenson, 2021). In trying to under-
stand and move on from this situation, we planned an itinerary for our
journey via a series of waypoints; each of these allowing one facet of digital
travel—being there in a distant place—to be examined in detail. We reflect
on our journey through the book in the rest of this section.
Our first waypoint on our journey through the book was characterised
by a focus on the being in being there. How can we be anywhere? It turns
out that we cannot be without being somewhere, and that this is natu-
rally the place in which our bodies are located. We presented different
philosophical and psychological perspectives on having the experience of
being somewhere, stressing the role of perception. The motivation for
this was to shed light on ways of understanding the experience of being
in another world created or mediated by digital technology. We looked
at representationalism, relationism, enactivism and the sense-data view,
and concluded that relationism offers the best understanding of percep-
tual illusions from an ordinary person’s perspective, a popular way of
defining telepresence experiences. We also suggested that enactivism is
also very relevant to understanding presence, because it stresses that expe-
riences are inseparable from the perceiver’s bodily activities. Enactivism
was heavily influenced by the work of Merleau-Ponty (1962). Both of
these approaches have something to add to our understanding of the
phenomena of digital travel. Representationalism is probably not well
known to many readers, but it has a straightforward answer to many
of the hard questions by claiming that what we see or experience are
representations in the brain.
Moving on to more practical psychological perspectives, we introduced
dual process theories of cognition (Kahneman, 2002; Stanovich & West,
2000), and suggested that acceptance of the reality of an external world,
in the moment, is largely a result of intuitive, rapid cognitive processing.
One for the first to observe this was the philosopher Baruch Spinoza.
Merleau-Ponty’s views on perception (Merleau-Ponty, 1962), based in
the relationship between the world, embodiment, action and perception,
also led us into a focus on transparency in interactions with the world—
technology that disappears from attention—and so with digitally mediated
environments. Direct perception accounts of presence are appealing in the
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way embodiment is seen as linking mind and body, with perception under-
stood as happening “out there”, not in the brain, both in our perceptions
of the physical world and of compellingly rendered virtual worlds. This
a key idea for understanding how digital travel can be experienced as
perceptually real. Enactivism and the direct perception approach both
stress that the possibilities for action in the world are important for the
experience of it. This, in turn, is influenced by the characteristics of the
world in which we act, through what are known as affordances.
This brings us to our second waypoint, a consideration of the question:
what is telepresence? How can technology provide us with the means to
escape our bodies, in some sense, and be there—where “there” is another
place, a place other than where our bodies are physically located? To
address this question we compared and contrasted different theoretical
accounts of telepresence, including presence as a pretence (a simulation
of reality [Slater, 2009]), as pretending (making believe the virtual world
is real [Turner 2016, Turner et al., 2016]), as a perceptual illusion (“the
illusion of non-mediation” [Lombard & Ditton, 1997; Riva, 1999]), and
as embodied attention to the surrounding (or apparently surrounding)
environment. Waterworth et al. (2015, 2020) define presence as “the
feeling of being located in a perceptible external world around the self”,
and suggest that “Varying feelings of presence reflect the extent to which
attention is focused on the external environment”. These views are all
well-accepted in the field, and all can be seen as contributing to a virtual
travel experience.
When we feel highly present, we believe in the perceived world in
which we experience ourselves to be. In that moment it is real to us.
Creating that effect is a key part of a convincing digital travel experience.
To have that experience, we must be attending to the digital world, feeling
as if we are (as-if-physically) surrounded by it. When that is achieved, our
imaginations are involved in at least two ways: in how we perceive our
surroundings, and in how we conceptualise our being there. While we do
not think that we need to make-believe (that the world is real), we do use
our imagination, and memory, to make sense of what happens there. The
world may be a simulation, be veridical, be misperceived or even be an
hallucination. In the moment of a vivid digital travel experience we do not
reflect on this question, we just have the experience. But we do believe
that it is veridical. When we later recall and talk about our experience, it
is as if it were real. At the same time, we refer to it as a digital experience
because we can reflect and reason that to have been the case.
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Our next area of focus was characterised by an examination of notions
of place, as outlined in work in tourism studies and other applied social
fields, focusing on the factors affecting sense of place (Relph, 1976) and
on how and when different experiences of place arise in the traveller. The
aim was to understand the factors that can be expected to contribute to
the digital experience of a distant place. Marketing and hedonic consump-
tion were also seen to be useful in understanding travel and travellers
(e.g. Hirschman & Holbrook, 1982; Holbrook & Hirschman, 1982), for
example, through the mechanisms of expressed intentions to visit a place
and word of mouth recommendations.
The tourist experience is an amalgam of different experiences (see, e.g.,
Cohen, 1979). It involves all senses and therefore their impact should not
be overlooked in efforts to theorise tourism’s experiential dimensions. A
key question concerns the ways in which digital experiences are similar
to or different from in situ experiences. We found that virtual travel is
unlike physical travel in many significant respects, but the experience of a
place—assuming the telepresence feeling of being there has been achieved,
is psychosocially similar. For digital travel and digital experiences too,
place attachment is a relevant concept for places that a person knows well.
Put another way, a digital experience can become a spatial experience if
our bodily senses are invoked by the virtual place. A key element in a
memorable experience is perceived realness. We concluded that facts and
accuracy have a similar role in digital experiences as in in situ experiences.
Our next stop was to consider empirical findings about the extent to
which some current technologies can elicit a sense of presence, and place.
We investigated and reported on factors affecting the sense of place expe-
rience, and telepresence, using a video game environment to facilitate
sightseeing behaviour among participants in the study. We went on to
explore in detail people’s attitudes to physical travel and digital travel,
both in the present and in the future. Interestingly, we were able to
identify a subset of people whom we can already categorise as “digital
travellers”. What will they encounter on their future digital travels?
Finally, in the present chapter, we considered selected trends in tech-
nologies used to enable various forms of digital travel, before outlining
an approach to thinking about new possibilities for implementing digital
travel based on metaphors and blending theory.
Despite our view that digital travel opens up many new possibilities,
we recognise that these may not be entirely benign. Nor do they always
go one way, with the physical influencing the virtual experience. Some
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people are overwhelmed by awe when they visit a place they have read
about in a novel, or seen in paintings. This may also happen with places
that have been experienced in virtual reality, say when planning a trip. The
actual place may overwhelm the visitor. On the other hand, the opposite
effect is perhaps more usual; the carefully selected and presented glimpses
of places experienced in digital promotional media may lead to the visitor
being disappointed and less able to enjoy the real possibilities of the actual
place. There may also be a kind of inverse presence (Timmins & Lombard,
2005), in which the actual place does not seem as real as a digital version.
It may become the case for some that actual places do not seem real
unless they can also be visited digitally. Physical places without Internet
access (there are still many of these) may seem less real than other places,
because visitors cannot share their experience of the place with distant
others.
The more we are sharing our experiences of the moment with distant
others, the less we may seem to be really there, where we physically are.
This is one of the comforting aspects of ubiquitous use of a mobile
phone: we can always escape, mentally, from where we physically are.
We may never really be there, in terms of our immediate experiences.
And yet, one of the joys of travel is to explore the unknown. If we reply
too heavily on digital previews, real-time dynamic maps with predefined
routes and labels, and so on, we lose the opportunity to stumble on some-
thing rewarding, by chance. But we also remove the possibility of getting
lost, and often reduce the level of danger we may expose ourselves to in
risky neighbourhoods. From this we can see that digital travel lacks, and
probably always will lack, the open elements of the unexpected that some
would say is essential to real travel (e.g. Leed, 1991).
For the future, we plan to explore more ways of blending features
from the universe of travel and that of technical devices and their inter-
action possibilities. For example, the metaphor “My phone is my home”
is intriguing, due to the apparent contradiction of a device that permits
contact with other people and places around the world becoming the safe
haven to be returned to during travels in the physical world. An alterna-
tive metaphor would be “My phone is an extra set of eyes and ears that
allow me to see and hear distant people and places”. More generally, we
believe that the impact of the level of presence experienced during digital
travel will become more recognised and significant, including as a factor
to deliberately consider during the design process. Selectable, or automat-
ically variable, presence would seem to be a necessary feature, to balance
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the need for vivid experiences of other places with the needs of attending
to significant events in the physical world.
Digital technology is used more and more in our society today, for
everyday tasks, in gaming and entertainment and especially for commu-
nication at a distance. Technological development continues rapidly, but
there is a need for more insight into the factors that support successful
and satisfying interaction at a distance. In games and in movies we can
see examples of what we might see in the future as consumer technology
and in professional use. Movies and games have a story, a narrative, and
we suggest that it is also partly due to there being a good story that we
can have a real travel experience. It was noteworthy that some partici-
pants experiencing virtual sightseeing in our Los Angeles study felt the
experience to be similar to visiting the actual place.
Many questions remain, but we believe that the physical and the virtual
can be blended to support embodied interaction in integrated digital
places. If digital places can become the object of real visits for partici-
pants, not only in the moment, but as lasting, memorable experiences
of being there, subjectively real virtual travel could replace the disjointed
social interactions through the Internet with which we have all become
so familiar. In them, it should be possible to maintain role-sensitive social
aspects of communication and behaviour.
Technology can be seen as taking us out into the world, to distant
places. But it also brings the world to us, to our devices. Will we leave
home to navigate, discover and experience distant digital worlds; worlds
that we experience as reality? Or will the distinction between home and
digital worlds disappear, as we carry with us the means to access distant
people and places at any time, and from everywhere we go?
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